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BRITISH WAR FINANCE 1914-1917.
Chapter One
The Position of Great Britain at the
Beginning of the War
In order to understand the War Finance of Great Bri-
tain 1914-1917 it is first necessary to have clearly in mind the
economic condition of the country at the outbreak of hostilities.
The state of trade, financial situation, debt, taxation, and
standard of living must "be passed in review with the purpose of
showing the trend of tie national policy and the degree of
strength in the resources which war feeds upon.
(a ) British Trade
The following table shows the trade returns of the
United Kingdom 1903-1914 inclusive, the year ending December
31st: *
Imports (Year ending December 31st)
1914 1913 1912
I Food, Drink & Tobacco £297,939,705 290,397,304 280,764,126
II Raw Materials & Arti-
cles Mainly Unmfg'd. 236,470,757 281,923,889 275,713,533
IE Articles Tfholly or
Mainly Manufactured 160,377,663 193,606,072 185,500,821
*The Economist (London) Supplements 1903-1914.

2IV Lliscell. & Unclassi-
fied (including
Parcel Post) 2,644.524 5.106.694 g. 918. 054
Total £ 697,432,649 769,033,959 744,896,514
1911 1910 1909 1908
I £264,334,176 257,788,416 254,333,628 244,248,108
H 248,162,717 261,242,032 220,153,047 203,488,744
ZEE 165,578,789 156,855,613 147,684,111 143,124,035
T T 2,483,495 2,554,112 2,569,751 2,279,856
Total i.680,559,175 678,440,173 624,740,517 593,140,723
1907 1906 1905 1904
I £247,386,504 238,229,466 232,373,723 231,790,837
n 241,594,587 211,509,201 188,071,557 182,210,518
JR 154,564,748 155,806,248 142,577,665 135,150,692
IV 2.558,257 2.442,978 2,256.457 2,210,077
Total i 645,904,176 607,987,893 565,279,402 551,362,124
1905
I 232,505,757
H 173,558,796
M 134,659,090
¥ ; . . . . 2.182.682
Total £542,906,325
Exports (Year ending December 31st)
1914 1915 1912 1911
I £ 26,936,176 32,607,760 32,689,985 29,051,728
H 56,711,568 69,896,428 59,427,555 53,729,567
HI 538,151,677 411,572,145 385,218,995 362,387,504
IV 8.431.504 11.385.085 10.097.471 9.155.661
Total 430,230,725 525,461,416 487,434,002 454,282,460
V* 95.489.586 109.655.718 111. 857.905 1Q2.72Q.799
Grand Total525,720,311 635,117,134 599,271,907 557,003,259
'Re-exports of Foreign and Colonial Merchandise

31910 1909 1908 1907
I . . . . . £ 26 ,113,383 23,627 ,458
50,782,779
297,303,812
6 ,65 5,395
21,943,251
52,386,611
297,061,087
5,828,630
22 ,748,847
55,004,750
342,173,851
6 ,277,148
Total 430,589,811
. . . 103.776.104
378 ,379 ,444
91,365,465
377 ,219 ,579
79 [665,569
426 ,204,596
91,972,141
Grand Total£534,365,915 469,744,909 456,885,148 518,176,737
1906 1905 1904 1903
I
. .
n . .
HE
. .
IV
. .
. . £ 21,128,825
. . . 305,608,711
19 ,472 ,952
35,558,829
269,959,757
5,031,929
16 ,926 ,051
35,670,495
243,942,434
4 . 278 . 917
16 ,362,490
35,380,239
234,891,447
4.255 .105
Total 375,672,913 330,023,457
7 7,798.521
300,817,897
70.521.918
290,890,281
69.557,035
Grand Total £460,836,299 407,821,988 371,139,815 360,447,316
The value of the imports represents the cos t, insurance
and freight, or when goods are consigned for sale the latest sale
value of such goods.
The value of the exports represents the cost and the
charge of delivering the goods on board the ship, an? is knowis a
the "free on hoard" value.
From these figures it is strikingly evident that a re
markahle growth has heen taking place. In 1903 total imports
were £.542 , 906 ,325 while in 1913 they reached £769,033,959 - an
increase in ten years of 41.7%. Total exports were in 1913
£525,461,415 - an increase of 80.7%. He-exports of foreign and
colonial merchandise oomparo £69,557,035 with £109,655,718 - an
increase of 57.6^. Finally, total trade was £905,353,641 in
1903 as against £1,404,151,093 in 1913, revealing a gratifying
increase of 55«5%« The figures for the consecutive years indi-
cate that the development has in no sense "been spasmodic, "but

rather a steady, continuous progress built upon the efforts of
industry. There was a wavering in 1908-9 hut 1910 showed ample
recovery. The year 1912 eclipsed all previous foreign trade
records. The greater part of this return was due not to a rise
in prices hut to actual increase in the volume of trade. The
latter half of this year however witnessed a slackening in the
rate of increase. The tendency became more marked in 1914 as a
comparison of the figures for the first six months of 1911, 1912,
1915 and 1914 brings out.
Imports first six months (£)*
1914 1913 1912 1911
I £135,752,101 136,056,020 128,600,165 119,936,196
n 139,382,698 145,735,107 155,072,330 130,078,691
HI 99,042,490 97,416,246 88,915,368
IV 1.706,001 1.552,840 1,409.558
82,852,891
1,255,198
^otal £375,883,290 378,760,215 353,995,222 334,122,976
I
II
in
IV
Y
Exports first six months (£)
1914 1913 1912 1911
12,106,862
26,330,780
£ 14,410,442 13,493,211 14,369,289
54,157,286 33,935,581 25,372,423
201,645,772 204,896,842 180,879,044 181,157,741
5,246,11] 4,750,174 4,692,289 4,072,914
59.276.415 59,055.577 57.85 3.721 54,887 ,444
Total £514,734,027 316,111,385 283,146,766 278,555,741
In order not to be misled in this regard, falling price
must be taken into consideration. The volume of trade was not
diminished as much as values woul* indicate. Inciex numbers for
the first half of 1913 and of 1914 in the following table show a
fall in prices in 1914, the only exception being raw textiles:
:The Economist (London) tables July of the respective years.

5"-lalf-yearly Index numbers (Average )*
First half
1913—1914
Eise f+) or
Amount
Fall (-)
Per cent
Vegetable food
Animal food
Sugar, coffee, tea
i o x a j. x o o o.
71.5 65.8
100.3 98.?
54.1 51.9
- 4.7
- 2.1
- 2.2
- 6.6
-r 2.1
- 4.1
- 4: . 1
Minerals
Textiles
Sundry materials
Total materials
113.7 101.4
82.0 83.0
83.7 83.3
91.2 88.1
-12.3
+ 1.0
- 0.4
- 3.1
-10.8
+ 1.2
- 0.5
- 3.4
Grand Total 85.9 82.7 - 55 P* _ ^ 7
T?av *f" V»o ^ v o 7*: ^ o -p "nyi n ^c;r ui o'lt? oi c llu U-L jj x j_ o ~ o 1911 to 1916 inclusive note "h In p
following
1911 .191? -1915 1914 1915 1916
80 85 85 86 108 137
The higher average for the year 1914 was due to the rise in the
latter half of the year. The course run was (1914) June 81.2,
July 82.4, August 87.9, September 89.3, October 89.8, November
88.8, December 91.6,(1915) January 96.4, February 100.9. The
rise continued at this more rapid rate. The average of the
prices of forty-five commodities 1867-1877 is taken as 100 in
making this comparison.
#
The first seven months of 1914 showed a shrinkage in
foreign trade compared with the same period in 1913 of
£4, 357, 000, but the last five months to the amount of £90,657,000
or 41/&. The twelve months decrease was £ 95, 014, 000 or 18%. Bat
for the large investments in colonial and foreign countries the
reaction in foreign trade in the months just preceding the War
would have been greater. The annual income of Great Britain
^Statist January 11, 1915, page 75.
#Statist Vol. 89, page 63 & Vol. 83, page 60.

6exceeds £2,000 million. It is therefore evident that the im-
ports of $.770 million worth of goods - paid for "by exports of
goods of over half a "billion pounds sterling plus shipping and
other services done for foreigners - plays a very large part in
the material prosperity of the country. It was computed that
at the close of 1913 Great Britain had no less than £4, 000
million capital invested abroad from which an income was derived
of £200 million while £150 million was due shippers, hankers,
"brokers and others. It would therefore have taken £300 million
exports to have offset the £659 ,000,000 net imports. The total
exports were £525 million. Hence some £200 million securities
were purchased.
("b) British Banking
It is to be expected that the expansion of hanking in
an old country will he slower than in a new one where population
grows rapidly thru immigration. Yet countries which progress so
fast are liable to great oscillations in fortune, expansion,
and panic. Income, trade, and production may increase 100%
with a setback of perhaps 20% to 25%, The advance of Great
Britain has been in comparison slow, but solid and substantial,
the reactions after periods of expansion being small and unim-
portant. The normal rate of growth has been about 25% per de-
cade with occasional reactions amounting to no more than 2-|$>, or,
in relation to population about 5>a, * No country enjoys a
steadier rate of progress and suffers less from readjustment
and reaction. The course is usually somewhat as follows: Vigor-
^Statist July 25th, 1914, page 169.

ous foreign trade, economy at home and consequent investment;
next an interim of reaction; then economy abroad and home ex-
pansion through spending. The first stage reached its height
in 1915 and the second had set in, though seemingly it was not
to "be severe.* Certain countries had expended as much as they
would "be justified in borrowing for some time to come hut other
countries had demands still unmet. The British Government had,
however, decided upon measures to temper the situation. These
steps ushered in the third stage. As an illustration, the
Government was to provide capital for the erection of 100,000
cottages in country districts. Further wnen the rate of inter-
est dropped, hundreds of thousands of small houses would he
built in the towns and other improvements would be made. Tnis
sort of situation would be favorable for the electrification of
railways
.
When international trade slackens gold flows in,
capital accumulates, and there is a demand for securities. Tne
position of London as the clearing house of the world for bills
drafts ^nd securities accentuates this tendency. The world
banking posit: on, # the value of banking assets and growth of
deposits, the ease with which the multiplicity of business in-
terests were served were all favorable signs. The only weak
spot was the extent of the gold reserve held by bankers, ample
enough for normal times but not a very substantial margin for
abnormal times as in war. There was, however, a considerable
amount of gold (sovereigns anc1 half-sovereigns) in the hands of
the people, used ih daily exchange.
* British Trade Journal, January 1st, 1914, paeres 8*4.
ifThe Great ".Var, Allen, V/hitehead, Chadwick/ Vol .2
,
pages 396-397

In the nineties there was a period, lasting several
years, of extremely cheap money. In order to employ the funds
left with them at a reasonable rate of interest, "bankers in-
creased their investments; 23$ of their resources were placed
in securities. These were "bought at a low figure hut since
had been written down farther. The Soer War brought with it
large issues of Consols and an extension of the list of trustee
investment stocks and securities held by bankers. This paper
suffered a great decline in value. In 1S98 the average price o
gilt-edged securities in which bankers invested was about 116.
The following table will show the movement. The five securitie
averaged are - fl) tjfjd Consols (2) India 3-§# Stock (3) London
County Council 2-§-?' (4) London & N.W. Railway 4$ Preferred.
Average of the Five Securities.*
Year Priced Yielc s
.
1898 116 2 14 3
1899 107-1 2 18 5
1900 106 2 19 3
1901 104^ 3 2
1902 103 3 9
1903 98 3/8
98i
3 2 9
1904 3 2 6
1905 99 3 2 3
1906 95|
92 3/8
92f
90"5/8
87^
3 4 6
1907 3 6 10
1908 3 6 6
1909 3 8
1910 3 10
1911 86 5/16 3 11 5
1912 83-§- 3 13 10
1913 78-| 3 18 6
1914 (June 30th) 82~ 3 15 2
Thus at the end of 1913 the fall had registered 3270, that is,
over £80,000,000. Considering low writing and short dates the
banks had to make provision for depreciation of something like
*Statist, July 25th, 1914, Vol. 81, page 172.

MO, 000, 000. It is a tribute to the stability of British bank-
ing that these losses were met out of annual profits without a
reduction in dividends except in one or two instances where an
ultra conservative policy was pursued. In many cases banking-
profits actually increased after allowing for depreciation.
Dividends as a rule were higher in 1913 than in 1898. The only
banks to suffer marked inconvenience were those which were
really trust companies and had placed the bulk of their money in
investment securities instead of employing it for normal banking
purposes - in the discount of bills and in loans to customers.
The Birkbeck Bank alone was forced to close. The average rate
of interest since 1899 is some 33% more than that of 1891-1898.
The figures are:
Average rate discount of bills % Average Loan rate
Bank of England £. s
.
d. £. s
.
d.
1880-1890 3 8 3 2 13 1
1890-1899 2 13 1 1 14 7
1899-1914 5 14 5 3 5 3
As before stated "British banking is less liable to losses aris-
ing from sudden and dramatic changes in economic conditions than
the banks of any other country." It is nevertheless essential
that the profits be large enough to take care of any loss that
may be incurred and to pay dividends sufficiently high to main-
tain the confidence of the shareholders and of the public. One
reason that banking dividends have not been higher is that
bankers have followed the policy of opening new branches in all
parts of the country. "These new branches do not yield but
rather drain profits for a few years." Since 1898, 3000 new
*Statist July 25th, 1914, page 172, Vol. 81.
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bank offices have been opened in the United Kingdom on balance
and the total number has been increased from under 6000 to
nearly 9000. A fact worth noting is that banks have not in-
creased their capital. At tne end of 1913 the paid up capital
of the banks of the United Kingdom was about the same as in
1895, though deposits had increased from £735 million to £1142
million. Apart from a moderate increase in reserve fund share-
holders have enjoyed 60% more deposits without finding more
capital. Including the surplus the proportion of capital to
total liabilities at the end of 1913 was 9.8$ in comparison
with 13.2$ at the end of 1895 and 16.5 at the end of 1885. De-
posits in 1380 were £356 million. Hence in one generation there
was an increase of 150$.
To sum up, the outlook was a favorable one. The
expansion o^ banking in the past, the solidity and stability of
the banks, and the efforts which were in evidence to increase
the gold reserves, together with the likelihood of great im-
provement in the value of and income from bankers' investments
and the consequent restoration of the proportion of paid-up
capital and reserve funds to deposits to a higher figure as ade-
quate security for further growth - all gave indication of a
great future built on unquestionable present strength.
(c) Debt, Taxation, Standard of Living.
In 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain had
a population of about So million and an accumulated wealth of
£?500 million, ler income did not exceed £300 million. The
debt incurred was some £895 million with an annual interest

11
charge of £33 million. The lebt charge was 11$ of the nation's
income and the debt three times the annual income and one third
of the total wealth. The total annual expenditure of 1815 vras
$65 million (25% of the entire income). The amount wag raised
with some sacrifice "but all in all without great hardship or
difficulty. At the outbreak of the European War Great Britain'
s
population numbered about 47 million in possession of a wealth
of £17,000 million and an annual income of £2400 million. The
debt had been reduced to about £706 million* and the interest
charge to £17,341,000 (less than three-fourths of 1? of the
annual income). The deb': was merely due from the nation as a
whole to individuals within the nation and the interest paid
came back to the Government in taxation either directly or in-
directly, a more pleasing situation than the owing and paying
to a foreign power. The total Government expenditure in 1913
(exclusive o" re-oroduct ive services - sucn. as Post Office and
telephone which yield substantial profit,) was only£l55 million
(equal to less than 7% of the income as against the 25$ in 1816).
The expenditure in 1913-1914 included large sums which the
Government was paying for education, sickness, and old age which
until a few years ago were paid entirely by individuals. Expen-
ditures prior to the War (1913-1914) were:-
*The debt is sometimes quote^ as £651 million but tais figure
is "exclusive of capital liabilities in respect of works/'
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Great Britain's Expenditures in 1915-14 (Prior to the War) *
Interest £ 16,894,000
Road Improvement Fund 1,395,000
Payments to Local Taxation Account 9,734,000
Other Consolidated Fund Services 1,694,000
Army 28,364,000
Navy 48,833,000
Civil Services:
Public Education 19,450,000
Health Insurance , etc . 7,066,000
01d-Ag:e Pensions - 12,600,000
Other" Civil Services 14,785,000
Customs and Inland Revenue 4 .485,000
Total 165,280,000
Sinking Fund 7,606,000
Post Office Services 24,607,000
Grand Total £197,493,000
In reality the Sinking Fund was £10 million as amounts 7/ere
applied on the Army, Navy, and Post Office votes.
Taxation in proportion to income showed increasing
lightness of "burden.
Lightness of Tax in Proportion to Income ff
Year Population National In- Taxation Annual Excess
come per per of Income over
annum annum Tax
1815-16 20,000,000 * 300,000,000 £ 62,000,000 £238,000,000
1859-60 29,000,000 700,000,000 66,000,000 634,000,000
1913-14 46,000,000 2400,000,000 163,000,000 2237,000,000
The margin of income in proportion to population and
in excess of taxation indicates further the improved position of
the people.
Year Income per Tax per Income in Excess of Taxation
Head £ Bead £ per Head of Population £ #
1815-16 15 3.1 11.9
1859-60 24.1 2.2 21.9
1913-14 52.1 3.5 48.6
i
Statist September 11, 1915, Vol. 85, page 413.
#Statist September 11, 1915, Vol. 85, page 414.
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No other country except the United States had so small
a burden in proportion to national income. Practically all the
necessaries of life and most of the comforts were free from tax.
The revenue came chiefly from luxuries. ITote the following
statements
:
British Revenue from Customs 1915-14 *
Spirits ^ 4,435,000
Wine 1,152,000
Beer 52,000
Total Alcohol 5,619,000
Motor Spirit 824,000
Tobacco 18,263,000
Tea, Coffee, Cocoa, Chicory 7,061,000
Sugar 5,272,000
Dried and Preserved Fruits 514,000
Miscellaneous 16 , 000
Total Custom Receipts I 55,569,000
British Revenue from Excise 1915-14 *
Exciseable Liquors :-
Beer Duty £ 13,625,000
Spirit Duty 19. 540. 000
Total 33,165,000
Spirit, Wine, and Beer
Licences 4.440.000
Total Alcohol and Alcohol
Licences 37,603,000
Carriage, Motor Car, etc. Licences 730,000
Patent Medicine Labels 560,000
Railway Duty 288,000
Miscellaneous 677 .000
Total Excise Receipts £39,658,000
The total customs and excises were £75,000,000 of
whichMS million were iipon alcohol, £.18 million on tobacco and
£11 million on tea, sugar, etc., that is, one half of l'-ji of the
nation's income. The "House Duty" in 1915-14 yielded ll
, 950 ,000.
This duty is a tax upon rentals of £20 or over per annum and
*Statist September 11, 1915, Vol. 85, page 414.
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includes about two million out of nine million houses. Death
duties (practically the only tax on capital) brought in
£27,359,000. The stamp tax (a tax of great variety and ligkt
incidents) returned £9 ,983,000. The income tax returned
£4, 729,000. The rate was Is 2d nominally but in reality gener-
ally was about lid and applied only to incomes of £160 a year
and over. On earned incomes of less than £2000 the tax was 9d
but virtually was only 4.44d on account of substantial abate-
ments made on incomes of from £160 to £700. The super-tax
(6d on incomes over £5000 ) brought in £3,120,000. The land tax
amounted to only £700,000 and the land value duty to £715, 000.
A summary shows the proportions at a glance:
Source of Great Britain's Revenue 1915-14 *
Customs £ 35,450,000
Excise 39,590,000
Estate Duties, etc. 27,359,000
Stamps 9,966,000
Land Tax 700,000
House Duty 2,000,000
Income Tax (incl. Super-Tax) 47,249,000
Land Value Duties 715,000
Total Receipts from Taxes £163,029,000
Postal Service £21,190,000
Telegraph Service 3,080,000
Telephone Service 6,530,000
Crown Lands 530,000
Receipts from Suez Canal
Shares and Sundry Loans 1,580,000
Miscellaneous 2 .304 .000
Total Receipts from Itfon-Tax Revenue 35,214.000
Grand Total £198,243,000
The tax (exclusive of alcohol and tobacco) on the
working classes was 10s in £100 and on the wealthier with
average incomes of £800 or over per person 9% of the income.
Statist September 11, 1915, Vol. 85, page 415.
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If alcohol and tobacco are included the percentages are 4$ of
the incomes of the working classes and 10$ of the wealthier, The
poor received hack two-thirds of the amount paid in "by tray of
health insurance, old age pensions, etc. The moral, physical
,
and mental condition of the people was being improved through
attention to health and education.
This review of the situation reveals that the United
Kingdom at the outbreak of the European War had just established
a world's record for foreign trade, had doubled her income in
thirty years, possessed a financial system of unquestioned
strength, had reduce 1 debt and taxation to a remarkably low
level, was bettering the condition of her people* and in spite
of a slight depression setting in was enjoying unprecedented
prosperity. It would thus appear that all conditions were favor-
able: first, to the maintenance of British credit and of the
credit system of the world; second, to the maintenance of
British trade at a high level; and third, to the raising of all
the money needed for war even though that sum might be very
great
.
i
^'Economist (London) July 4, 1914, pages 14-15.
i
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Chapter Two
The Early Months of the War
(a) The Moratorium
It was only natural that the effects of the great
struggle should at the very "beginning be felt by the Exchange
and the "banks. The immediate shock of war is always tremendous
in financial circles. While prosperity reigned supreme and the
fruits of peace were "being enjoyed Great Britain made no plans
to put the country upon a sound war "basis. It is one thing for
the wheels of industry and finance to he running smoothly and
at a rapid rate and quite another for the mechanism to "be ad-
justed to receive an additional and unexpected "burden. The
United Kingdom was practically as unprepared to meet the
financial emergency as to oppose the trained armies of central
lurope with an adequate number of equipped and drilled troops.*
It is scarcely too strong to say that the "bankers were taken
completely by surprise." #
The difficulties in London were not brought about by
any widespread loss of confidence on the part of bank deposi-
tors, nor were they primarily due to fear, present in previous
panics, that accommodation would not be obtainable at a price
at the Bank of England. 2 The trouble began with a breakdown
in the system of foreign exchange and bourse dealings thru an
Finances and Costs of the Present European War by Army War
College, Washington, D.C. November 1915, Page 5,
#8tatist, September 5th, 1914, page 531
^Economist, October 24th, 1914 /page 686.

unprecedented flood of liquidation in foreign financial centres.
Austria declared war on Servia Tuesday July 28th, 1914, and the
Continent immediately considered a collision between the powers
inevitable. Every stock exchange was swamped with selling
orders. On Thursday, July 30th only London, lew York, and the
Paris Parquet remained open. That day brought a rush "to sell
anything and everything not alone by foreign but also by home
sellers." " rith the bonafide liquidation of open accounts,
the realization of shares by nervous holders, and a large
amount of "bear" selling, the tide was all one way. The world's
financial system was thrown out of gear. Thursday, July 30th,
recorded the failure of the highly respected firm of Messrs.
Derenburg & Company - a firm with large foreign connections.
The situation was brought home. In response to representations
from a number of firms the Exchange did not open July 31st.
Banks remained open Friday and also Saturday but made
the mistake of meeting demands for withdrawals by paying only
10$ gold and 90$ Bank of England notes. Those requiring gold
were told to cash the notes at the Bank of England. Alarm
arose and there was a run on the Bank; it paid gold but owing
to the heavy demand by bill brokers who had to repay their bank
loans, raised the rate. The Bank rate had stood at 3% from
January 29th, 1914 to July 30th when it moved up to 4^. An ad-
vance was made to 8% on July 31st and on August 1st to 10$ -
"the figure which precedent has fixed as the distress signal
which calls for remedial measures,* and the highest level
reached since 1866.# Monday, August 3rd was a regular bank
*Economist, October 24th, 1914, page 686.
#The Great -Var by Allen, whitehead & Chadwick, Vol.2, page 399.

holiday. Parliament, however, extended this holiday to August
6th inclusive and further decided upon a month's moratorium
with respect to bills of exchange. The extension of the holi-
day applied only to hanks.* The general moratorium did not
inc lude
(1) debts of trie Government
(2) liabilities not in excess of 5,
(3) payment in respect of rent, taxes,
or maritime freight
(4) debt of firms, etc. resident out-
side the British Isles
(5) bank notes issued
(6) dividends or interest payable on
stocks, funds, or securities
(other than real or heritable
securities) in which trustees
are authorized to invest.
Interest had to be paid. The moratorium affected only the
date on which it was necessary to pay the debts and no other
contractual obligations .# The moratorium stopped all specu-
lative business on the stock exchange, but cash dealings could
continue
.
Upon the reopening of the banks the Treasury under
the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1914 issued £1 notes
(followed August 13th by 10s notes) convertable into gold at
the Bank of England and legal tender. to any amount. X Post
Office money orders were also made lep:al tender. £225 million
of the emergency £l and 10s notes were authorized. Banks
were empowered to borrow the Currency Notes from the Government
up to 2Q?o of their liabilities on deposits and current account.
The Bank of England on August 6th reduced its rate to 6$ and
.House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Vol.65 Col .1808
.
fStouse of Commons Parliamentary Papers , Vol .65 , Col . 2243,
XA Memorandum of the Finances of the Great "Var, More ton Frewen,p
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on August 8th to 5%. During the holidays the people had "been
told that the hoarding of gold would be very unpatriotic.
Steps were taken to hold gold in Canada, Australia and South
Africa to the account of the Bank of England.
Traders had to be provided with banking facilities
and so on August 13th the Government guaranteed the Bank of
England under certain conditions against any loss it might incur
from discounting bills of exchange, either home or foreign,
bank or trade, accepted prior to August 4th, 1914.* The Bank
of England announcement and the subsequent circular issued by
the Government August 19th provided for a relief of both sides
of the money market - borrowing and accepting. The Bank of
England took in the bills and their holders repaid their loans
at the joint-stock banks. These in turn increased their
balances at the Bank of England. Money lending on stocks was at
a standstill and new bills were few. Hence these balances were
partly used in granting over drafts to manufacturers to whom
war had brought heavy orders. On September 4th under the Gov-
ernment 2-uarantee the Bank of England undertook to lend to
accepting houses to enable them to meet their liabilities. The
loans were repayable one year after the war and were charged
at 2% above 3ank rate. There were upwards of £350 million of
uncollectible debts due from enemy countries in the form of
international bills at the time of the Government 'guarantee
. By
November 1915 only £33 million remained to be held in abeyance
till the end of the war. The whole or practically all of the
£33 million due bid's very fair to be collected when peace is
*See Statist August 15,1914, page 42V & ff. for details.

so
restored.* In a single day the Bank of England discounted
"bills to the value of £9 million hut the demand soon fell to
£5 million, £-§- million, and so on as the supply of working
capital increased and the necessity for discounting grew less
urgent. The assistance of the Bank of England in past crises
had "been most noteworthy, and it again proved itself to he
more "than ever before the pivot on which British finance re-
volves." #
Out of eight thousand replies to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer's questionairre addressed to the leading hanks,
traders, accepting houses, etc., 4500 favored an end and 3500
an extension of the moratorium. X The decision however was
to extend the time till October 4th anci at a later conference
for still another month. This extension applied to all hills
of exchange except bills on demand and checks and did not
affect rents anc* rental traders debts.
Matters regarding the Stock Exchange took somewhat
longer for adjustment. The Exchange did not open until
January 4th, 1915.
(b) The Finance Act of July, 1914.
On July 31st the Finance Act of 1914 was passed.
This act was the carrying out of budget plans made months be-
fore and while it was in no sense a war measure the debate and
the character of the provisions of ffhe bill ere significant in
the light of future development. Increases in expenditure over
*Statist .November 6 (t 1915, page 459.
vfHouse of Commons Parliamentary Papers , Vol .66 , columns 68-69.
SBritish War Finance , 1914-1915 f#R, Laws on, page 13.
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1913 of £4,218,000 were expected and the deficit already of
£ 5, 330, 000 was awaiting disposal.* This £10 million total had
to be met by new taxation or from raiding the Sinking Fund.
Six years before the amount called for was only two-thirds of
the present expenditure. One million pounds sterling was to "be
employed in oiling the wheels of national insurance", £2,450,000
to be paid in additional grants to local authorities for roads,
police, public health, etc., and £586,000 for educational
pur-roses
.
A tax of 5d per pound was placed on tea and the in-
come tax increased. This latter measure applied only to
"unearned" incomes. Subject to the usual abatements, 9d per
pound was charged on incomes up to £1000; from -£.1000 to £1500
there was an addition of three half-pence; from £1500 to £2000
am increase from 9d to Is; £2000 to £2500 to Is 2d; above
£2500 - Is 3d.# A super-tax of 6d in the pound was proposed
on incomes exceeding £5000 with an abatement of £3000 but later
on Lloyd George substituted s super-tax starting at 5d in the
pound on incomes of £3000 of which £2500 was exempt and rising
rapidly to a maximum of nearly Is 4d. Thus the total income
tax on $.100 t 000 a year would be increased from Is 7d to 2s 7d
per pound. The Death Duty rate was left the same up to estates
of ^60^000 from which a gradation of Vfo additions was imposed
to a maximum of 20^ (instead of 15yc) on estates of one million
pcmnds and upwards. Five pence per pound was laid on tea.
Economist (London) May 9th, 1914, pp. 1066-1067.
fflncome Tax Practice, W.E. 3.nelling, Appendix pp .42QA-420M.
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In the 1909 Bridget* Lloyd George introduced taxes to
provide a gradually increasing amount for social betterment -
in the words of the Chancellor's momentous speech "to wage
implacable warfare against poverty and squalidness" .# The yield
from these taxes in 1915-1914 was. as follows:
Spirits & 2,500,000
Tobacco 2,900,000
"otor Spirits 84-0,000
Liquor Licences 2,360,000
Metor Car Licences 640,000
Estate Duties 7,150,000
Stamp Duties 1,440,000
income Tax 5,440,000
Super-Tax 3,520,000
Land Value Duties 715.000
Total £27,285,000
These changes it was supposed would furnish ample funds for
social reform for years to come; so they would had not the Army
and Nary eaten them up. The allocation planned in the 1909
Budget was:
(1) Navy
(2) Old age pensions, including paupers
pensions
(3) Improvement of main roads
(4) Development Grant (notably for agricul-
tural purposes
)
(5) Setting up and financing of Labor
Exchanges and National Insurance
(6) Belief of local taxation.
Up to 1914 the revenue was sufficient for all of these purposes,
Mr. David Lloyd George stated, except the last. Foreign ship-
ping programs forced Great Britain to follow, and reduction in
taxation was not possible. As a matter of fact the tax per head
*British Budgets, 1887-1913, Bernard Mallet, pp .298-513 ; 596-399
.
;rlt may be that the War itself will cause greater changes for
the better in the life of trie mass of people and in the atti-
tude of the Government toward them than the Chancellor had in
mind in the 1909 Budget.
^"Touse of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Vol.64, Col. 836.
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in proportion to the national debt was diminishing. In 1887
the amount was £20.11; in 1899 ("before the Boer vTar) £15.52;
in 1914 £15.37. It was supposed that the "abnormal ship-build-
ing period" would be passed by 1916.
In eighteen years the budget increased from £100
million to over £200 million. The question was raised in the
House of Commons as to where additional revenue would come from
in ease of a European war. Mr. Hayes Fisher was of the opinion
that if the income tax was now raised it could not be increased
in time of war when the need of funds was imperative. Andrew
Bonar Law said - "It is from the Income Tax that every one
used to get the necessary money in time of war. VJhere would you
get it now?" Further opinion was that if the income and death
duties were raised much higher they would break and result in an
absolute decrease. On every hand there was a clamour for reduc-
tion in Army and Navy expenditure. For the second* time in the
history of P arliameiit closure was adopted limiting debate on
the Finance Bill. Conflicting argument and criticism regarding
his task was such that Lloyd George ironically said that he was
expected to arrange the taxation in such a way that no one
should bear it yet everyone should benefit from it.
fc) The Budget of ITovember 1914.
On August 6th Mr. Asquith moved a vote of credit of
£100 million as a war measure .# This was the beginning of a
course of expenditure the magnitude of which only the most
*0n April 18, 1910 the Prime Minister moved the guillotine re-
solution and closure was adopted on the Finance Bill which had
already been discussed for almost a year.
#House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Vol.65, Col. 2073.

imaginative foresaw. The second vote came the middle of Novem-
ber and called for £225 million; the third followed on February
25th for £287 million. As a ready means of obtaining funds the
Chancellor decided to issue Treasury Bills* (a plan originated
by Mr. Bagehot ) . There were £10,100,000 outstanding due to
mature in November and December 1914 and January 1915. The
first emission for war purposes was made August 19th for
£15,000,000. At intervals of about two weeks several successive
installments followed. Most of these were for £15,000,000, and
were to run for six months. The issue of September 16th was
divided - £7,500,000 for six months and the same amount for one
year. The following table saows the facts regarding the nature
and popularity of each issue to the end of 1914:
British Treasury Bills .f#
Date of
Maturity
1915
Amount Duration
Months
Amount
Tendered
Feb. 22
Feb. 27
Mar. 19
Apr. 10
Apr. 84
May 7
Se-ot .18
£15,000,000
15,000,000
7,500,000
15,000,000
15,000,000
15,000,000
7,500,000
6 ,350,000
6
6
£42,115,000
40,193,000
24,561,000
30,493,000
43,162,000
26 ,633,000
22,487,000
Placed Priva tely
Date of Average Price
Issue 1914 Received %
Average Rate of
Discount fo
£ £
Aug. 19 98 3 5.29
Aug. 26 98 2 3.96
S«pt. 16 98 10 8.73
Oct. 7 98 5 4.38
Oct. 21 98 2 6.59
HOT. 4 98 3 3.79
Sept. 16 96 11 8.42
3 13 1.42
3 15 6.09
2 18 6.55
3 9 3.24
3 14 10.83
3 13 6.83
3 8 3.58
; Information Vol. 3', No. 4, p. 366.
^Statist, February 20, 1915/ Vol. 83, p. 275.
^Times (London) November 30, 1914.
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To Mr. David Lloyd George fell the task of finding
the money. His "budget of November 17th i?as accordingly anxious-
ly received. Very little additional taxation was imposed to the
disappointment of the press and the relief of certain wealthy
interests. The duty on tea was raised from 5d to 8d the pound -
the point it reached during the Boer War, During the Crimean
War the high mark was Is 9d.* After an elaborate investigation
Mr. McSenna concluded that the English drink "beer mostly in
half pints and that a tax of a half-penny per half-pint would
be best and at the same time less easily increased in the shift-
ing of the burden by the seller. The Chancellor of the Exche-
quer accepted this suggestion and increased the tax 17s 3d/ ie.
from 7s 9d to 25s. # The hours of sale were curtailed but
t-iis was offset by a decrease in the proportion of proof spirit.
The income tax was doubled, the maximum for unearned incomes
being 2s 6d. Small incomes were exempt as before. The maximum
super-tax was made 2s 6d. Both of these taxes were on the
graduated plan. The poor were reached thru the beer tax, the
richer thru the income and super-taxes, and both thru the tea
tax*
Lloyd George in the course of his speech laid do?7n
the principles which should govern the war finance of Great
Britain. He said "It is easier to raise taxes in a period of
war and lever them in a period of peace trian to raise even
lower taxes in a period of peace. War is the time for sacrifice
in nations. They are in the spirit of sacrifice and that makes
*Economist (London) ITovember 21, 1914, page 907.
#W.R. Lawson, British War Finance, 1914-15. page 311.
fzf This amount refers to the tax per barrel.
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a difference.
I want to impress upon the Committee with all the
earnestness at my command that it is desirable that the nation,
during this period of inflation, should raise as much money
out of taxation as it can be induced to contribute. Every
twenty million raised annually by taxation during this period
means four or five million taken off permanent burdens there-
after imposed on the country"*
If the weight of these words is rightly judged the
program of taxation offered was wholly inadequate. It
necessitated the raising of some £350, 000, 000 by borrowing.
The Treasury Bills, maturing in six months, called
for continuous retirement and so a more permanent form was de-
#
sirable. Accordingly a loan was offered November 16th for
£350 million. The bonds were issued at 95$ bearing interest
at and maturing 1925-1928. They were thus virtually on
a 4% basis. Payments were spread over three months. The Bank
of England was to advance amounts equal to the issue price of
the stock or bonds deposited without margin at rate of interest
lfo below the current Bank rate, fife This accommodation was to
be available for three years ^ This provision aided in keeping
the price up. It 7^as desired to make the loan as big a success
as possible for effect. Until this time the cost of financing
the war had been borne chiefly by British bankers who purchased
*House of Commons, Vol. 68, Cols. 354-355.
#House of Commons, Vol. 68, Col. 374.
/Statist, November 81,1914,page 458.
•House of Commons, Vol. 66, Col. 376.
^Statist, June 26 , 1915 ,uage 704.
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the various issues of Treasury Bills. * Even nor; small in-
vestors played no part ; £100 was the lowest subscription. The
number of applicants was, however, gratifying, reaching
100, 000.
#
On March 5th, 1915, 2fo five year Exchequer Bonds made
their appearance. About £50 million were issued. This device
was originated by Mr. Gladstone during the Crimean War (1854)
and was again employed during the Boer far (1900-1901).
Toward the close of 1914- the country began to recover
from the terrific shock felt at the beginning of the conflict,
and a eampaign for "business as usual" was ushered in. Business
men, politicians, and the press eave the idea unanimous sanc-
tion. The exhortation bore fruit. ;iigh wages led to extrava-
gant consumption of luxuries. The lower classes were espec-
ially lavish and wasteful. They even exceeded the liberal
advice that "Everyone should act in a normal manner and should
confidently expect that his income will be maintained, and that
he will be able to go on doing those things and spending just
as much money as in recent years." <i>
The early months of 1915 fulfilled the third of the
four stages Professor Moulton describes. They are in order: h
(1) Retrenchment with the immediate shock of war.
(2) Business about as usual.
(3) Extravagant expenditures (because large pur-
chasing power in the hands of the Government
means increased employment and substantial
increase in wages for the laboring classes).
*Commercial & Financial Chronicle, Vol.99, pp. 1483-84.
^Statist IJovemb-r 28,1914, Vol. 82, p. 479.
^Statist, August 8,' 1914, Vol. 81, p~ 394.
^Industrial Conscription, H.G. I.'oulton, p. 54, (in Financial
Mobilization for far).
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(4) Inflated prices and enforced retrenchment
in the purchase of luxuries, and even-
tually even of many necessities.
Great Britain learned the fallacy of the "normal
liTing" doctrine but not without the cost of the lessons of
experience. The re-action came slowly and with some reluc-
tance. The taxation measures for the year 1915-1916 will he
sufficient proof of this statement.
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Chapter Three
The Fiscal Year 1915-1916
(a) The Gold Situation
In addressing the iou^e of Commons the Prime Minister
(Mr. Asquith) said -
"I would venture, if my words may carry their message "be-
yond these walls, to my fellow-countrymen outside, to say to
them - to householders, to employers, indeed to everybody - that
in a small hut not unimportant way one of the best services they
can render to the country at this moment is to see that all what
I may call 'till 1 money - the smaller change of our social and
industrial life - is paid not in gold but in notes and in paper."
In other words the Currency £l and 10s notes were to take the
place of gold which would then be available for the use of the
Government.* The fact that Scotland and Ireland had been using
£l notes for several years was of material assistance in popu-
larizing the new notes. As the people would take them, the
amount in circulation was expanded. To the credit of the British
people there was little hoarding. By Hay 12th, 1915, notes to
the amount of £43,519,000 were in use. It was thought advisable
to establish a substantial gold fund for redemption. On May 12th
this amount was £28,500,000; in addition a c?sh balance of
£6,257,000 to the credit of the Treasury on deposit with the
Bank of England and £8,623,000 of Government securities were
* British War Finance 1914-15, Lawson, pp. 95-98.
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held.* In case of urgent necessity the redemption fund could
he used for other purposes as the country had to have a con-
siderable amount of currency of small denominations and would
have had to pass currency notes from hand to hand in daily
transactions. As an indication of the status of the note issue
in the middle of May, the total amount in circulation, includ-
ing the Bank of England notes, currency notes, and Scottish
and Irish bank-notes, equaled £101 million, against which the
banks and Treasury held £108 million gold, (that is £7 million
excess) plus a large amount in the vaults of joint-stock banks.
The deposits of joint-stock banks since the beginning of the
War had increased from £1100 million to over£1200 million, while
deposits, Government and private, of the Bank of England had
risen from £45 million to £219 million. Making due allowance
for credit operations, the real money was a much greater sum
than had ever been accumulated in the British banks in a similar
period. # The success was due to a combination of fl) confidence
of the people (2) prompt action of the Government and. (3)
co-operation of the banks. It should also be borne in mind
that British possessions yield approximately 65$ of the world's
gold production.^
Had there not been counteracting forces at work, the
outlook would have indeed been optimistic. Great Britain was,
however, making very large purchases of war materials in foreign
markets, especially in the United States. At the same time
Statist, May 15, 1915, page 307.
fStatist, May 15, 1915, pp. 303-307
^The Finances of Great Britain, E.F. Davies, page 51.
I
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exports were unable to balance the scales. With increasing
numbers of laborers drawn from industry curtailing the manu-
facture of exports with shipping difficulties growing greater,
and with the consumption of imports of comforts and luxuries at
an enormous figure, gold began to move in large quantities to
lew York. During the third week of August the American sight
exchange fell to 1-.64. This gave an added impetus to the out-
pouring of gold. In normal times an adverse exchange would be
met by an advance in the Bank of England Rate. This would in-
duce a number of persons all over the world to reduce their
obligations to London and, foreign money would come in. The ex-
change would recover, the export o 47 gold stop, and after a short
time, fresh supplies of gold come in. Now, however, this remedy
was not possible. Great Britain was no longer exporting large
quantities of capital to other lands for investment. On Septem-
ber first the American exchange tobogganed to 4.50, (some papers
claim 4.48). It was believed that speculative operations con-
tributed their part to the fall.* This was the lowest point
touched since the present system of international exchange was
devised in 1873. On the different basis of quotations formerly
in use, sterling fell in 1857 to the equivalent of about 3.53
(i.e., a discount of over 27%), That was a year of commercial
an* financial crisis both in America and Great Britain. The
following table shows the extremes of the six years 1910-1915.
#
^Economist, September 4, 1915, pp. 355-356.
#Statist, January 29, 1916, pages i-viii.

Year
~
T
i
;
Low
1910 4.884 4^855
1911 4.876 4.855
1912 4.88 4.85
1915 4.886 4.854
1914 6.00 * 4.855
1915 4.8575 4.50
(The pound sterling1 is worth $4.8665 gold.)
Steps were taken immediately to "bolster up the rate
of foreign exchange. Nearly £2 million gold was shipped to the
United States, supplementing the sale of securities, in an
effort to turn the tide. As a temporary measure this means
was of courpe effective. Two days later the recovery was to the
point of 4.71 - a change of from 7.6$ discount to 3.2$. A
committee started for America September first to negotiate a
loan to aid in steadying the Exchange. So fluctuating and un-
stable was the rate at that time that when the committee left
London it stood at 4.50, when they arrived in America at 4.72-§-,
and when they again reached England at 4.62. The delegation
was well received in the United States and succeeded in arrang-
ing the Anglo-French loan of £100 million (one-half for Great
Britain anp one-half for Prance). This would reduce the amount
of gold necessary to ship across the water. The bonds were
jointly guaranteed by Great Britain and France, and were repay-
able at the end of five years or convertible at the option of
the holder into 4|$ bonds of the British and French Governments,
repayable not earlier than fifteen years and not later than
*The *6.00 mark- was
(
the result of a temporary upward rush
Immediately after the outbreak of War. This rise was caused
by apprehensions in the United States that the produce could
not be marketed as previously.
/
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twenty-five years "by the two Governments jointly and severally.
Fifty per cent of the loan was payable October 29th and the
"balance December 3rd. The issue pr^'ce to the public was 98,
and
,
including redemption, the bonds were to yield £5 9s 3d%.*
The rhole issue was sold to an underwriting syndicate at 96
so that as far as the British Government was concerned the rate
of interest to be paid was £5 18s lOd%. This is a high per
cent in comparison with loans floated in Great Britain or France
but investment conditions are different in the United States.
The Government wa^ severely criticised for not securing better
terms .# The exchange was restored to 4.72, saving losses
which otherwise would have been sure to occur. Internal loans
by Australia and Canada for their war expenses also relieved
Great Britain.
A further scheme devised by the Chancellor of the
Exquecher was to borrow American and Canadian railroad and
industrial securities and issue a marketable certificate in re-
turn entitling the owners not only to the interest wnich their
securities gave but also to §$> interest over and ahove those
returns. The deposited securities were tnen usee as collateral
for temporary loans raised in the United States. The Treasury
reserved the right to dispose of the deposited securities at
any time if it so desired. If this option were exercised the
Government agreed to pay to the depositor in sterling the value
frequently instead o^ giving the rate of interest in per cent
the British state the terms in the amount of money to be re-
ceived as interest ^per ^100; £5 9s 3d % is about 5-§- <fo.
^British War Finance, 1914-1915, Lawson,
-op. 281-283.
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of his securities, "based upon the closing quotation in New
York on the day of sending notification of sale, with an addi-
tional 2-|$ on the value so calculated.* The British Government
offered to purchase securities outright from the owners who
were willing to sell, giving in return 5$ ExehequerBonds . A
credit of £10 million was thus created by the middle of Novem-
ber, Mr. MeKenna estimated that there were from £300 to £800
million of these securities available if they could be attracted.
Such an expedient could not be a permanent remedy. There was
after all a limit to tnose securities. Then too, large holders
would be in a measure unwilling to sacrifice their future
prospects to share an increased value.
The rate on Treasury Notes was advanced for the pur-
pose of aprse^ling to American investors. On October 27th the
new rates appeared thus:-
4-3.
<f ------ three months
4-7/8$ ------ four months
5 jo ______ nine months and one year
On November 13th the 5$ rate applied to all the bills.
By these various means the exchange was restored to
4.77-7/8 on January 6th, 1916 and was maintained fairly con-
stant. In 1915 and up to March 4th, 1916, Great Britain sent
directly or indirectly to America £80 million gold.
fb) The £600,000,000 Loan
On April 13th a new policy was put into effect of
issuing Treasuries daily at published rates of interest in con-
i
trast to the former method of bringing them out at stated
*Statist, August 19, 1916, pp. 345-344.
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intervals in fixed amounts. Low rates were secured, for example
&ff> for three month bills, 3-5/8 for six month and 5j for nine
month and one year. In a month and a half ^115,785,000 were
placed (£15,582,000 a week) and by June 21st £235,000,000.*
The reason for this great popularity was the scarcity of hank
and commercial hills In London. The normal supply of £400
million was depleted, some estimate 40% and others 60#« This
vacuum was filled with Treasury Notes. In addition many per-
sons and firms were keeping unusually large cash balances on
hand against contingencies and instead of investing the money
were disposed to place it in Treasury Notes.
Treasury Notes have their disadvantages. They are
liable not to be renewed upon maturity when the Treasury needs
funds most, when it might be most inconvenient to buy them out.
If tr^de with young countries revives or investors desire to
purchase new war stock with their savings the quantity of bills
in circulation can not be maintained. In the second place, by
means of Treasury Bills bankers' money and not public money (if
we may make that distinction) is borrowed. Furthermore, large
emissions boost the interest rates. Accordingly, on June 21st,
1915, the issue of the second permanent loan was announced«#
The time was ripe.x The money market had passed thru
the complete stagnation of the early days when money was neither
cheap nor dear because not obtainable. Old loans had been con-
tinued simply because they could not be paid. This state of
*Statist, Hay 29, 19,15, pp. 521-522 & June 19, p. 664.
fHonse of Commons, Vol. 72, Cols. 950 & ff.
^British V/ar Finance, 1914-1915, Lawson, p. 279.

36
affairs led to considerable anxiety and a general desire to be
prepared against the future. Cash was kept on hand with a
resulting great increase in the deposits of the hanks. The
custom of the Government in paying cash rather than creating
hills further increased the difficulties of hankers in finding
employment for their funds. The Loan of November 1914 was
accompanied by a return of floating capital from abroad. The
Treasuries had taken the place only of commercial bills. The
bankers could not invest in the new loan heavily and it was
also believed that the general public would subscribe liberally.
The Loan was offered at par with a bonus of a full half-year 1 s
interest, payable on December 1st, 1915. The bonds could be
redeemed at par 1925 or at any subsequent date and fell due
1945. The interest rate was 4-|$.* If a future Government loan
was issued at a better rate (other than short-term paper) the
holder could convert the bonds into the new loan. Both the
wage-earning class and the well-to-do were appealed to. Applica-
tions for the loan were received at the Bank of England for
£100 or multiples thereof and at the Post Office for £5 or
multiples thereof at the rate of £4 19s N 4d fully paid stock,
8d representing the discount for payment in advance. Post Office
script vouchers of the value of 5s, 10s and £1 could be pur-
chased which when they reached £5 or any multiple of £5 could
be exchanged for the bonds. Wage-earners were thus enabled in
a time of high wages to make provision for a future perhaps less
favorable. Stock of the previous war loan floated on a 4%
Statist, June 23, 1915, pp. 703-705.
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basis could be exchanged for the new "bonds "by subscribing an
additional £100 per 5100 exchanged and the payment of £5 in
cash on account of the discount at which the former loan was
issued. Holders of Cons .Is bearing 8-|$ interest, could cover
£75 into £50 of the new War Loan if they also bought for cash
£100 more new stock. Annuities bearing and 2-|$ could be
exchanged £67 for £50 and £78 for £50 respect ively of the new
v
.
r
ar Stock if an additional £100 cash was also invested in this
stock.
No limit was placed on the amount which might be
subscribed for the loan.
rfToward the close of the calendar year the demand for
Treasury Bills indicated that the people were ready to invest
for short periods. Hence the Treasury authorized the Bank of
England to receive applications for Exchequer Bonds. These
bonds bore 5% interest and were repayable on December 1st, 1920.
They could be convert e-* at face value into future loans other
than issues made abroad or issues of Exchequer Bonds, Treasury.
Bills, or similar short dated securities for war purposes. If
the owner wa- neither domiciled nor ordinarily resident in the
United Kingdom the bonds were free from British taxation. The
amounts were £100, £200, £500, £1000, and £5000. If they de-
sired, holders of American securities could sell them to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and invest the proceeds in the bonds.
3anks and insurance companies raised about £570 million and the
general public pushed the amount up to £592,345,000 in November.*
^Statist, (London)
,
July 17, 1915, pp. 99-100.
London Economist November 20, 1915, p. 853.
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£347 , 500,000 of thifl amount was conversions, as follows:
Consuls f&§#) £204,000,000
Annuities f8§#) 7,500,000
Annuities 1,000,000
November War Loan (S|-%) - - - - 155,000.000
£347,500,000
Previous to this war the largest loans ever floated "by a
European Government were £80 million and £120 million by the
French Government in 1871 and 1872 respectively to pay off the
Prussian indemnity. The larger loan was then oversubscribed
twelve times (five ti ;es by the French nation and seven times
by foreign investors.) Before 1914 Great Britain's largest
single loan was £60 million in 1901 during the Boer war.
(c) The Economy Campaign.
Before the middle of 1915 the feeling that "business
as usual" was not the proper attitude began to assert itself.
The Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and other
Cabinet Members addressed meetings in the Guild Hall. Mr.
McKenna on one occasion said: "The purpose of this meeting is
economjr - private, individual economy by local authorities,
economy by Government Departments, economy throughout the nation
in the consumption of commodities." Trad? returns showed that
the laboring class was importing a 1 1 kinds of luxuries from
America and was S]?ending recklessly.* Bonar Law at another
meeting drove home the necessity for increased saving and re-
duced expenditure. He said: "All money that is spent in these
days on superfluous comforts or luxuries, whether in the shape
*Speeding the Silver Bullets, Lewis H. Freeman, Review of Reviews
December 1915.
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of services, means the diversion of energy which can be "better
em-ployed in the national interests, either in supplying the
needs of our fighting forces in the field, or in making com-
modities for export which will go to reduce our indebtedness
abroad. And on the other hanfl , every saving we make by the
curtailment and limitation of our productive expenditure in-
creases the resources which can be put by our people at the
disposal of the State for the triumphant vindication of our
cause."* Committees such as trie National Organizing Committee
for V.'ar Savings and the Central Advisory Committee for War
Savings were formed. Meetings were held throughout the country,
instructive competitions staged, lectures and exhibitions given,
and posters and literature freely used. The retrenchment
Committee found that many wasteful methods had been in operation
in the Civil Departments. A saving of 1332, 300 was effected
in the Civil Service. Efforts to secure permission to include
in the work of the Committee an examination of the Army and
lavy were unsuccessful .# However, thru the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Secretary of State, and the First Lord of the
Admiralty an independent investigation was carried on. Many
extravagances existed, such as the paying of £5000 retainers'
fees to physicians while allowing them to keep their private
practices, paying twice for the same supplies, granting officers
unwarranted additions of pay, hiring of nine ships at monthly
cost of £86,000 to accommodate interned aliens of military age.
Statist, July 3, 1915, p. 14.
^Statist, March 18, 1916, p. 487.

Government contracts were exam: .:ed and camp ration and freight
bills looked into. Pamphlets were issued and widely distributed
Strenuous endeavors were put forth toward the close of the year
to promote the economy which the conditions warranted* The
Prime Minister stated the demands under four heads:
(1) Economy both in public and in private expenditures.
(2) The assistance of all classes in meeting the
necessary expenditures of the State,
(3) Diminished consumption and increased production.
(4) Smaller imports and greater exports.
An estimate was made by Sir A. Markham (though probably some-
what exaggerated) of a daily waste of one million pounds ster-
ling.
#
fd) The September Budget.
Over a month before the appearance of the budget a
deputation of bankers and merchants of London called on Mr.
Asquith and urged strict economy and new taxation. The thrifty
one-ninth of the people had supported the loans and it was now
time to secure contributions from the other eight-ninths.
Apparently this could be done only through taxation. Viewed
from the side of expenditure, it was argued that borrowing tends
to lead to extravagances and price inflation. For the most
part investment in the loans had been made not from additional
saving but from borrowing. What was needed was a reduction in
the consumption of luxuries and comforts so that capital and
labor would be released for w?2r purposes. The economy campaign
was not proving sufficiently effective, and so the Government
*louse of Commo.is, Vol. 75, Col. 1201.
#House of Commons, Vol. 75, Cols. 1226-1227.
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was urged to use the force of taxation.
On September 21st Hr. KcKenna, the new Chancellor of
the Exchequer, presenter5 the 1915 Budget, long delayed.* His
speech was short, taking only about an hour and a quarter and
was a marvel of clearness and force. The "bankers and financiers
who came late to avoid the usuak much - extended preliminary re-
marks arrived after the speech was finished, to their surprise
and chagrin.
The Budget created strong feeling and strange to say
brought forth the conflicting criticism of being too extreme
and of being too moderate. On one point all agreed - that the
estimated expenditure for the coming year of £1590 million 7/as
a staggering sum to raise.# The argument was on the means to
be employed to obtain the money. The conservative London
Economist in its issue of September 25th (page 463) pronounced
the speec i of the Chancellor as "a plain unvarnished statement
of unparalleled revenues, an inconceivable expenditure, and an
unimaginable deficit, followed by a lost of fresh taxation
which imposed an unprecedented burden on the country." Not all
journals were so deeply stirred. The Statist in its issue of
September 25th (page 485) was of the opinion that the budget
was "made ur> of half measures, and while it might cause thought,
did not solve the problem." The taxes were just enough to make
the country feel thara and would lull it into the fallacious
notion that no further effort need be put forth. Drink fin
spite of the enormously increased consumption) was permitted to
*Britisa -,V?r Finance, 1914-1915, Lawson, pp. 324,327.
#Economist, September 25, 1915, pp. 453-464.
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go scott free on account of the opposition »f certain interests.
ITo check was imposed on unnecessary travel, on theatre going,
or on the "pleasures of the picture palace". The rich were
not hindered in "absorbing the services of men servants and
maid-servants who could, be better employed". Mot or-spirits
were too lightly affected.
As time passed the general feeling was that the taxes
were inadequate both for revenue and for the reduction of the
consumption of luxuries. Once more had the Government taxed
lightly and invited the nation to make the necessary economies
in domestic expenditure voluntarily. Consequently extravagances
continued in spite of an adverse trade balance of £600 million
a year. The criticism did not apply to all parts of the budget,
There were features which were worthy of high praise. The
excess profits tax was introduced for the first time, and called
for 50% of the annual surplus profits where the increase since
the T7ar exceeded flOO. A pre-war standard of profits was used,
based on the average of any two out of the three last pre-war
trade years, choice to be accorded the tax-payers.* If the
latter coul* show the Commissioners of Inland Revenue that the
amount was less than 6% on the capital as existing at the end
of the last pre-war trade year, the pre-war standard of profits
would be taken as equal to 6$ if the business by a company or
other corporate body and 7% otherwise. The last pre-war trade
year was defined as the year ending at the close of the last
accounting period before August 1st, 1914.
*Excess profits Duty, W.E. Snelling, pp. 30, 31,33.
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The income tax and the super-tax were increased, the
exemption limit lowered, and fewer abatements granted.* A dis-
tinction was made "between "earned" and "unearned" incomes. The
income tax was now to begin at £131, at the rates of 2. Id per
pound sterling for wholly earned, 2.8d for partly earned, and
2.8d for wholly unearned incomes. The rates in per cent are
.825 % , 1.166$, and 1.166 ^respectively. The upper limit in
the rates was made 3s 6d in the pound for all three classes, Is
higher than in November, 1914. The super-tax ran from lOd to 3s
6d (i.e. from 4.166 % to 17-g- f-v) per pound, graduated from £2500
to £l0,000.jrf # The duty on sugar, a Government monopoly, was
raised from Is lOd to 9s 4d. The rates on tea, tobacco, cocoa,
coffee, chicory, and dried fruits were increased 50 %• Motor
spirits bore 3d per gallon. Import duties of 33 1/3 % ad
valorem were imposed on the following articles, partly for reve-
nue and partly to discourage importation:
Patent medicines, automobiles, motor-cycles, cinema films,
clocks, watches, musical instruments, plate glass, and hats.
On September 30th the tax on hats, plate glass and commercial
motor c?rs was dropped.^ Postal , telegraph, and telephone (all
three state owned ) rates were increased. The proposal to abol-
ish the half-penny postcard met with no favor and so was aban-
doned .
*How Britain Pays Her War Bills, Review of Reviews, December,
1915, Vol. 52, p. 727.
^Income Tax Practice, 1, E. Snelling, See Supplement pp. 5-29.
#British War Finance 1914-1915, f. H. Lawson/page 328.
*War Finance - Sir George Paish, in Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Vol. 79, page 282.
^The Economist (London), October 2, 1915, page 500.

Chapter Four
The Fiscal Year 1916-1917
(a) The Third War Budget
No finance measures of importance were in the fore-
ground during the six months following September 1915. There
was considerable discussion, of course, as to the "best method of
procedure for the fiscal year 1916-1917 and an abundance of spec-
ulative prediction. In April, 1916, the Third War Budget was
presented. There was no uncertainty in Mr. LlcZenna' s speech.
His first object he said was to secure revenue. Innumerable
small taxes had been urged upon him, but they could at best be of
but of little use for his purpose. They would only bring in a
small revenue, would cause much inconvenience, and would be
"costly to collect". To use his own words further - "There is a
limit in practice to the number of new taxes which may be im-
posed at any time".* Accordingly the policy was adopted of in-
creasing the existing taxes in amount and range and of adding
only a few entirely new sources of revenue. The object was
three-fold: to obtain sufficient revenue to meet the expenditure
for civil purposes, to pay as large a proportion as possible of
the cost of the War, and to distribute fairly the burden of tax-
ation over the whole community. It was estimated that the total
expenditure for the year would be £1825 million, that is, five
million pounds sterling a day. The £1825 million was arrived at#
*War Finance, J. A. ,R. Marriott , Nineteenth Century, May. 1916
Jol. 79, "Dp • 1124-1142.
#House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 81, Col. 1055.
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in the following manner:
million
Navy, Army, Ministry of Munitions 1120
Miscellaneous 30
1150
Advances to Allies and Dominions 450
Consolidated Fund Services (in-
cluding debt charge ) 138
Civil Service, Customs, Excise
and Inland Revenue 60
Post Office 27
Total 1825
The Chancellor expected to obtain about £509,275,000 gross
revenue, or, allowing for seven million pounds sterling fore-
stallments (i.e. clearance of dutiable goods in anticipation of
higher taxation) a net revenue of £.502,275,000. The actual ex-
penditure proved to be £2,198,113,000 - much more than the esti-
mate - and the revenue returns £514,106,000 from taxes and £59,
322,000 from non-tax sources.
The income tax was arranged according to the follow-
ing graduated scale:*
Income Tax per £
Earned Unearned Former
Unearned
Under £300
s d s d s d
2 3 3 3
Between £ 300 and £500 2 3 3 6 3
£500 and £1C00 2 6 4 3 6
£1000 and £1500 3 4 6 4
£1500 and £2000 3 8 4 6 4 6
" £2000 and £2500 4 4 5 5
Above £2500 5 5 5
(2s 3d is at the rate of 11.25 % and 5s at 25 fo. )
The method of collection at the source was employed at
the maximum rate, regardless of exemptions and abatements. Ap-
plications for recovery had to be made and involved considerable
*War Finance, Paish, J. of the Royal Statistical Soc. ,May' 16p.282
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inconvenience and sometimes even hardship.* The super-tax re-
mained the same except that the point at which it began was
raised from 3s 6d to 5s. The excess profits tax was raised to
60 f-» It was estimated that this extra 10 fo would yield more
than all the other additional taxes combined. Controlled estab-
lishments were required to turn over 80 % to the Ministry of Mu-
nitions •
Perhaps the most popular tax was that on amusements,
such as cinemas, theatres, music-halls, boot-ball matches, horse
races. The rates were from -|-d on tickets not exceeding 2d up to
Is on tickets of over 7s 6d, with an additional Is for every 10s
or ^art of 10s over 12s 6d.#
One-half pence per pound was added to the sugar duty.
Protests were made on the ground that the amount contributed de-
pended not upon the ability to pay but on the size of the family.
Mr. MeKenna replied that through the Government monopoly the
price had been kept lower than conditions warranted, and lower
than the price in New York City.jzf The duty on cocoa was quadru-
pled (from L|d to 6d), and that on coffee and chicory doubled
(from 3d to 6d). Tea was left at Is. Opposition resulted in an
equalization of the"break?ast cup" duties by the lowering of co-
coa and raw coffee to 4-§-d a pound, thus establishing between
these two and tea the more approved ratio of 3 to 8. Cider and
perry bore 4d per gallon and table waters containing sugar, or
*The Nations Balance Sheet, H.J.Jennings, Fortnightly Review
Vol. 105, Dage 894.
^Statist, April 8, 1916, pp. 627-629.
^The House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Volume 81,
Column 1059.
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which, were fermented, the same amount, while 8d per gallon was
placed on other table waters. This was the first time in re-
cent years that a duty had "been levied on these drinks. Cider
was taxed in the eighteenth century.* The spirit taxes were
unaltered. Temperance advocates expected fresh duties along
this line hut since the returns were already falling off and
the taxes were for revenue purposes only they were not increased.
British matches bore an excise of 3s 4d per 10,000 and imported
matches a customs duty of 3s 6d per 10,000. This tax raised
a little comment though some regarded it as "niggling". The
same might be said of the taxes on table waters, cider, and
perry.
Motor cars up to sixteen horse-power were to pay from
Ml 4s to £81 8s and those exceeding sixteen horse-power from
£181 18s to £1261. The pre-war rates were £21 2s to £41 4s and
^61 6s to £421. These heavy license duties were afterwards
dropped. The substitute adopted required all car users to
obtain a permit before they could buy petrol and for t:iis per-
mit to pay 6d a gallon, with half rates for doctors, veterinary
surgeons, and commercial users. Thus the tax was transferred
from the ownership to the use of cars. # Later on commercial
users were exempted
. The wisdom of this last step might with
reason be doubted. The owners had the ability to pay, the
machines were hard on the roads, and economy in the use of pe-
trol was imperative.
*War Finance, J .A.R.. Marriott , Nineteenth Century, May 1916
Vol. 79, pp. 1124-1142.
#The Economist (London) Vol. 82, pp. 662-665.
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The Chancellor offered a plan whereby he expected to
receive about three million pounds sterling from railway fares.*
One pence was to be charged on single fares exceeding 9d and not
over Is; Id per Is or part of Is was to be charged on single
fares exceeding Is and on single and return fares over Is 6d.
Season tickets were subject to the same provision. All journeys
partly or wholly by rail commencing in the United Kingdom and
ending outside the British Isles were to carry a duty of 4s on
the first-class fare, 3s on the second, and 2s on the third.
#
All railway receipts except in the Tubes go direct to the Gov-
ernment and so tie collection would be a simple matter. A
further favorable argument would be the diminishing or the
elirr.jnatine of "joy-riding". The measure was not well received
in the louse of Commons.^ The numerous exemptions which would
be claimed and the fact that the railroads had already abolished
excursion rates and raised the fares caused the tax to be
abandoned. It was argued that the increased fares, as they then
stood, would bring in the desired revenue.
The Budget was a step in the right direction. Com-
pared with past budgets the taxation was heavy, yet it was borne
with scarcely a murmur. Perhaps Mr. McXenna held the view ex-
pressed by Montesquieu in "Esprit des Lois". "It is a general
principle that the greater the degree of liberty enjoyed by
the subject, the heavier taxation may be". Itmay be that the
people did not fully realize the significance of the measure or
*House of Commons, Vol. 81, Col. 1058.
#Statist, AToril 8, 1916, -o-n. 627-6 9 9.
^Statist, A^ril 15, 1916, p. 678.
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that pride prevented Training. It is more likely, however, that
the seriousness of the conflict was making an impression and
that patriotism was asserting itself.
(b) The Mobilization of Securities (Scheme B)*
The scheme for the mobilization of securities in-
augurated in 1915 was not yielding the desired returns. The
Chancellor, therefore, decided to impose a tax of 2s in the^fc.
(in addition to the regular 5s) on incomes derived from any
stocks, shares, or other securities which the Treasury was
"willing to purchase in connection with any arrangement for the
regulation and maintenance of the foreign exchanges," and to
give no exemption, abatement, or relief under the Income Tax
Acts "in relation to such additional duty except in favor of
the income from any securities for the time being deposited
under any scheme for the regulation or maintenance of the for-
eign exchanges or of the income of any securities belonging to
any institutions trading in foreign countries under the regula-
tion of the local law." The 2s tax helped, but expenditure
increased so fast that the scheme was not long sufficient.
In the middle of August, 1916, Scheme B was brought
forward. This plan included a larger variety of bonds and stooksuf
The new list covered a rather wide field, for example, certain
bonds of the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, Egypt, Bolland, Swiss Government Federal Railways, and
the municipalities of Copenhagen and Stockholm. Furthermore,
The Times (London), August and September 1916.
rLiterary Digest, September 2, 1916, pp. 584-537.
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"prior charge stocks were included and in a few instances, also
preference stocks," of the Canadian Pacific, the Canadian
Northern, the Grand Trunk and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railways,
as well as the five more important Argentine lines - the Argen-
tine Great Western, the Buenos Ayres western, and the Central
Argentine. It was understood that the list might he still fur-
ther extended if considered advisable. These securities were
to be loaned (not purchased) to March 31, 1922. The Treasury
reserved the right to return the securities to the depositors
at any time after March 31, 1919 upon giving three months' notice
of intention to do so. As in Scheme A of 1915 (known as the
American Dollar Securities Plan) the Treasury handed over to the
lander all interest due on the securities and in addition •§$>
per annum on the face value of the bonds and stocks. The
securities were to be sold in case of the default of the Govern-
ment on its loan. It was supposed that the Treasury would not
disnose of any of the securities though it held the right to do
so if the necessity arose. In that event the lender would con-
tinue to receive from the Treasury the same payments - his regu-
lar interest plus §$ - as if the securities had been retained,
until the end of the loan period. Then securities of the same
description and nominal value as those originally deposited, or,
at the lenders' option, the deposit value of the securities,
with an addition of 5% on that value would be returned to him.
In return for the securities loaned the Treasury issued deposit
certificates, available as collateral for bankers' loans, etc.
The 2s tax was removed and action was made purely voluntary. It
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should be noticed that in so far as British holdings in railways
were concerned only prior charge stocks were included, Thus the
governing control was not jeopardised. The minimum amount of
bonds or stocks receivable was £1000 or £5000 but small inves-
tors could co-operate with the bankers and stockholders. Trans-
fers by depositors from Scheme A to Scheme B could be made if
notice was given by September 14th, 1916.*
On August 24th another quantity of securities was
needed by the Treasury. Bonds of the Governments of Argentine,
Chile, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, of the municipalities of
Amsterdam, Christiana, Copenhagen, and Stockholm, and various
Canadian Railway bonds guaranteed by the Canadian Facific Hail-
way Company, and certain bonds of the Chilean Northern Railway
bearing the guarantee of the Chilean Government were gathered
in. The original list under Scheme B contained sixty-six
securities of a nominal value of approximately 600 million, and
this second list added forty-eight securities the face value of
which amounted to over £60 million and the market value to about
£55 million.
fc) British War Borrowing in the United States. #
As a result of Scheme B the "United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland Loan" calling for £50 million was floated
in the United States September Ist.jrf Two year Gold Notes were
given maturing September 1st, 1918 and bearing interest and
free from all British taxation. They were offered to investors
^Statist, August 19', 1916, pp. 343-344.
ffThe Times (London), September. to December inclusive, 1915.
^Commercial & Financial" Chronicle
,
Vol.103, p. 1262.
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at 99. Great Britain had the option of redeeming a part or the
Whole of the notes on giving thirty days' notice up to August
51, 1917 at 101 and thereafter to August 31, 1918 at 100£. The
purpose was to a-o-oeal to the large financial interests of the
a
United States. The notes were underwritten at 98 by/powerful
hanking syndicate headed by J. P. • Morgan & Company. The notes
were secured "by collateral the value of which was to be maintain-
ed during their currency at 120$ of the loan. For this purpose
£60 million (market value) of stocks and bonds were deposited
with the Farmers Loan and Trust Company of New York City. The
collateral consisted of three distinct groups of securities,
each group of the same value
;
fl) The first block comprised United States railroad and
industrial bonds, notes, and stocks.
(2) The second block was made up of Canadian Government
securities or securities guaranteed by the Dominion
Government and bonds and stocks of the Canadian Paci-
fic Railway.
(3) The third block contained securities of the Governments
of Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland.
A number of the securities of the third group had not reached
New York at the time of the Loan and so New York Stock Exchange
collateral and cash were deposited temporarily. Any of the
deposited securities could be substituted for others but re-
latively the amounts of the three blocks were not to be changed.
Without going into detail regarding other loans made
ifi the United States the following table will give a good idea
of their extent: *
Extracted from a summary in the Statist (London) June 16 1917
pp. 1176-1177. ' ' '

British War Loans Raised in the United States
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Description Amount
OOO' s £
omitted
When
issued
Rate of Issue Date of
inter- price maturity
est *
British Bank
ing Credit .
Wheat Pur-
chase Credit
Metropolitan
Water Board
Notes . .
Coll. Notes
1 year .
2 year .
2 year .
3 year .
British Por-
tion of Anglo-
French Loan
(no coll. ) . . 50,000
5 year Coll.
Notes . . . 50,000
10,000
5,000
1,280 Sept. 1916»
20,000
50,000
30,000
30,000
Jan. 1917
Sept .1916
Jan. 1917
Oct. 1916
Oct. 1915
Oct. 1916
6
5
itml §
June 20,1917
Sept. 18, 1917
5i
°2
99.52 Feb. 1, 1918(h)
99. Sept.l, 1918
99.07 Feb. 1, 1919(b)
99.25 Oct. 31,1919
98. Oct. 15, 1920(a)
98.50 Oct. 31,1921
Total 226,280
(a) Convertible at the option of the holder into 4§#
bonds repayable not earlier than fifteen years"
and not later than twenty-five years from the
original date of the loan.
(b) Convertible at the option of the holder into 5-£$
bonds maturing in twenty years.
In- December 1916 £10 million of 6% Exchequer Bonds were sold to
Japan
.
The Federal Reserve Board of the United States ad-
dressed a warning to the National Banks of the United States
advising against paper which was not liquid. The Board said -
"Further investments in paper of this character and extension
of credits to the belligerents are not healthy banking but are
directly the province of investors who are willing to take the
risk in the outcome." It seemed probable that the War would be
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a prolonged struggle and that borrowing would continue. The
short dated paper would be converted into long-term bonds later
on and too large a proportion of what ought to be banking re-
serve would be locked up. At this time the twelve District
Reserve Banks held over million (407-J million dollars) in
reserve and the member banks over £103 million (515 million dol-
lars). It was only natural that there would be a tendency to
invest freely. Some fears were entertained in Great Britain
that the admonition might seriously affect British finance.*
fd) The Victory Loan #
In endeavoring to grasp every opportunity to obtain
funds where they were to be had, many devices were resorted to.
About the first of June 1916 War Expenditure Certificates were
issued in amounts of £1000, £5000, £10,000, drawn for two years
at 5$. Bankers, business firms, and investors found at their
disposal a variety of maturities from three months to a little
over five years, for example: three, six, nine, and twelve months
Treasury Bills, two year War Expenditure Certificates, three and
five year Exchequer Bonds. The war Savings Certificates reached
down to the lowest incomes. There was no tax on them and the on-
ly restriction was that no one person could hold more than five
hundred Certificates.^
The Currency Notes were greatly increased. The rise in
the price of commodities made necessarjr a larger amount of cur-
rency for daily payments. It was also true that general pros-
*Statist, December 2, 1916, p. 1194.
#The Times ( London
)
,' January, February, March, 1917.
^Statist, June 10, 1916, p. 1194.
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perity caused the people to carry more cash in their pockets.
The Notes outstanding at the beginning of 1915 were £38 million;
at the "beginning of 1916 £103 million; and "by the middle of the
year $117,536,000.*
Early in December 1915 J. P. Morgan & Company was
authorized to sell, in the United States, British and French
Treasury Bills for thirty, sixty and ninety days, not renewable.
On the 31st of the month the withdrawal of the 6% Exchequer
Bonds, the War Expenditure Certificates, and all classes of
Treasury Bills, leaving only the War Savings Certificates for
borrowing purposes showed plainly that a loan was soon to be
made •
The 3onds were offered in January 1917 and were of two
classes. Class A, issued at par, paid 4$ throughout the period
of the loan (redeemable in twelve years and repayable in twenty-
five years) without income tax. Class B, issued at 95, bore 5fo
throughout the period of the loan (redeemable in twelve years
and repayable in thirty years) subject to an income tax. The
rate might go up or might drop. The tax at the time was 5s in
the pound. It would be a question as to whether the bonds of
Class B would yield more or less in the long run than those of
Class A. Foreign and Colonial holders of this Wfh form of loan
were not liable -for British taxation. The tax of 10s fee per
deed of power of attorney for non-residents in London or Dublin
or persons unable or unwilling to attend personally at the bank
in regard to inscribed stock, etc. was removed. Registered
*Statist, Hay 27th, 1916, p. 976.
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stock was not charged income tax at the source. Subscriptions
could be made for £50 allotments or multiples thereof or through
the Post Office for £5 and upward.
A sinking fund of l-§f£ per annum was provided for the
purchase of the bonds of either loan for cancellation when the
market price fell below the price of issue. In this vie.y- the
market would be steadied. Purchases were to be made wiien £10
million had accumulated in the sinking fund.
Death duties could be liquidated by tender of either
of the two forms of loan at issue prices, providing the deceased
had had the securities six months before his death.
The Loan was for an unlimited amount. The Chancellor
of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister both clearly indicated
that no future loan would be on better terms. Other methods
would be resorted to rather than to offer more. Of course at the
timc it was not known to what extent furtner loans would be
necessary.
Applications for the b% issue, including conversions
of Treasury Bills, equaled £966,048,000 and of the 4$ issue,
including conversions of Treasury Bills, £22,658,000, making a
total of what may be called "new money" of £988, 672,000 of the
new War Stock.* There were over five million subscribers
.#
Holders of £779,955,000 of the loan of 1915 applied for
£821,005,000 and holders of £268,656,000 of the 5fo and 6% Ex-
chequer Bonds for £282,792,000 of the new 5% loan. The nominal
amount of Class B outstanding is £2,069,845. Conversions from
*Statist, May 5, 1917, pp. 765-766.
xEconomist, March 3, 1917, p.424
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the loan and from Exchequer Bonds into the 4$ loan accounted
for £28,726,000 bringing the tax-free issue up to £51,384,000.
It is significant that only 2.42$ of the applications were for
the tax-free issue. The following table snows the success of
this Third Great War Loan. The figures need no comment:
The Third War Loan
5$ Loan 4% Loan Total nominal
Amount
New subscriptions
including Treasury-
Bills of£L30,711,
950 £ 966,048,000 22,658,000 988,706,900
On stock exchanged:
4f$ Loan £821,005,000 28,726,000 1,152,523,000
5% & 6$
Exch. Bonds 282,792.000
Total 1.105,797,000
Total Stock Out-
standing £2,069,845,000 51,384,000 2,121,229,000
i
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Chapter Five
Summary And Conclusions
(a) Taxation
In August 1914 Great Britain was not prepared for a
great war, for a protracted, intense struggle with a powerful
military nation. She had not set herself to that end. It is
true that she had kept an ever watchful eye on rival navies but
her army was very small. The energies of her people had "been
devoted rather to the building up of her foreign trade. An era
of unrivaled prosperity had been ushered in. Hen did not believe
that nations would dare to risk their all to the ravages of a
modern world war; at least they did not conceive that such a
catastrophe was at all imminent. With their heads in the sand
3y had a feeling of security and conducted their affairs ac-
cordingly. Criticism must bear lightly, however, for this de-
lusion was almost universal among nations.
A week before trie War broke out, when the clouds were
very black, the opinion of experts that the financial system of
Europe could not stand the strain of a general war was so firmly
fixed in the minds of the statesmen that Sir Edward Grey (the
British Minister of Foreign Affairs) said to the Austro-Kunga-
rian Ambassador in London: "The possible consequences of the
present situation are terrible. If as many as four great powers
of Europe - let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany -
were engaged in war,, it seems to me that it must involve the
expenditure of so vast a ^um of money and such an interference
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with trade that a war would "be accompanied or followed by a
complete collapse of European credit and industry".* The full
weight of this statement is yet to be tested.
For many months Great 3ritain entertained the blind
faith that the War would soon be over. She did not see how
deeply the plans of the enemy were laid, backed by some fifty
years of preparation on an enormous scale and perfected to the
minutest detail. She could not grasp the full meaning of the
situation. Accordingly, while the policy of heavy taxing dur-
ing war times was advocated as sound, the principle was all too
slowly applied. The following table of customs and excises for
the three budgets as compared with pre-war rates makes this
point clear:
War Taxes; Customs and Excises
Prior November September April
to war 1914 1915 1916sd"sd sd sd
Tea per lb. 5 8 1
Beer (foreign). . per barrel 8 3 25 6
3eer (home) • . . per barrel 7 9 25
Cocoa per lb. 1
Coffee per cwt. 14
Chicory (customs) per cwt. 13 3
Chicory (excise) per cwt. 12 1
Dried Fruits:
Currants .... per cwt. 2 o
Figs, plums, raisins,
etc per cwt. 7 o
Sugar (customs) . . vex cwt. 1 10
Sugar (excise) • • per cwt.
Table waters containing su-
gar or fermented per gal. 4
Other per gal. 8
Cider and perry • . per gal. 4
Tobacco, unmanufactured and
unstrinned # . . x>er lb. 3 8 5 6
1*
21 42
19 10 39 8
18 8 38 6
3
10 6
9 4 14
7 11 8
*The Independent, February 19, 1917, page 299.
#A11 duties on tobacco were correspondingly increased.
j^Var Finance, George Paish, J. of i:oyal Stat. Soc.,May 1916,
pp. 281-282. (Corrected).
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Prior November September April
to war 1914 1915 1916sd"sd sd sd
Motor spirit . . . per gal. 3 6
Patent medicines,
per Is bottle 1-|- 3*
Matches
:
-Small boxes
Customs, per 10,000
matches 3 6
Excise, per 10,000
matches 3 4
Large boxes
Customs, per 10,000
matches 1 9
Excise, per 10,000
matches 1 8
Cinema films, clocks and ad va-
parts, watches and parts, lorem
musical instruments • . • 331/3%
Imported motor cars ad val.
and motor cycles .... 33-1/3/0
Motor car license duty:
21.2s **41.4s
Hot exceeding 16 h.p. • . to to
41.4s 81.8s
Exceeding 16 h.p 61.6s **181.18s
to to
421.0s 1261.0s
Motor cycles:
Not exceeding 4 h.p. . . 1 (21.2s
Exceeding 4 h.p 1 ff of
duty
payable
in case
of a mo-
tor oar
Entertainments
:
Up to 2d £
2d to 6d 1
6d to 2s 6d • 2
2s 6d to 5s 5
5s to 7s 6d 6
7s 6d to 12s 6d 1 o
Every 10s or part of 10s
over 12s 6d 1 o
'Dearer medicines increased in proportion.
**Later dropped.
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The income and super-taxes made a better showing and
the excess profits tax, though tardily adopted, yielded good
returns and was a splendid innovation. This tax was strictly a
war measure and was devised to take in the abnormal profits be-
ing made off of tie country's necessity. Seven years before the
7/ar Mr. Asquith, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared the
income tax to be an "integral and permanent part" of the pres-
ent financial system. In the Budget speech of 1909 Mr. Lloyd
George said: "The Income Tax, imposted originally as a temporary
expedient, is now in reality the centre and sheet anchor of our
financial system". The following table shows the changes made
in the rates of these three taxes including April, 1916:
War Taxes; Income Tax, Su-cer-tax. and Excess Profits Tax. *
Prior to November September At)ril
war 1914 1915 1916
Income tax# Is. 3d per£ 2s 6d 3s 6d 5s Od**
Super-tax 6d per £ lod to 2s 8d 10d to 3s 6d
over £5,000 graduated graduated
from 1 2 , 500 from £ 2 , 500
to £8,000 to £10,000
Excess Pro- 60 per
fits tax Nil Nil 50 per cent cent
#The basis of taxation under Schedule B (charged in respect of
the occupation of lands) from one third to the full amount of
the annual value.
**Graduations also changed. Rate 2s 3d in the £ on earned in-
comes not exceeding £500; 2s 6d from £500 to £1000; 3s from
£1000 to £1500; 3s 8d from £1500 to £2000; 4s 4d from £2000 to
£2500; 5s over 42500. Rate 3s in the £ on unearned incomes not
exceeding £300; 3s 6d from £300 to £500; 4s from £500 to £1000;
4s 6d from £1000 to £2000 ; 5s over £2000.
It is difficult to say just what should be the proper
proportion between direct and indirect taxation. By a "direct"
tax is meant one that is ultimately paid or is intended to be
*TCar Finance, Georsre Paish, Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, May, 1916, p. 282.
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paid "by the person from wheal it is collected, and "by an "in-
direct" tax one levied upon one person with the avowed intention
that the burden shall he shifted to another. The final inci-
dence of a tax is, however, often hard to determine. Taxes
which appear to he direct often turn out through the genius of
the "dodger" to he indirect. As accurately as can he determined
the table following shows the proportion between the direct and
the indirect taxation of Great Britain from the time of Sir
Robert Peel through the fiscal year 1916-1917:*
T vi fl t t* p r* *h
i
1 RATJL<->t± J. 73 «n ?7 n
1851 67.0 33.0
1861 62.0 38.0
1871 61.0 39.0
1881 60.0 40.0
1891 55.7 44.3
1900-1 50.6 49.4
1901-2 47.5 52.5
1902-3 47.6 52.4
1903-4 50.7 49.3
1904-5 50.5 49.5
1905-6 49.7 50.3
1906-7 48.6 51.4
1907-8 48.9 51.1
1908-9 47.4 52.6
1909-10 43.6 56.4
1910-11 43.6 56.4
1911-12 42.7 57.3
1912-13 42.4 57.6
1913-14 42.4 57.6
1914-15 40.0 60.0
1915-16 35.4 64.6
1916-17 28.0 72.0
(War profits is figured as a direct tax. Excluding this amount
the proportion for 1916-1917 would be 37 to 63.)
Thus in a period covering slightly more than two generations the
*War Finance; The Ppurth War Budget, J. A. R.Marriott, Nineteenth
Century, Vol. 79, p. 1134, (1893 to 1912-1913 taken from "British
Budgets 1887-1913" by Dr. Bernard Mallet).
l!»it**€* mo-rt no*** &I*£*»S|tX od 1661) |*81J .a -ft «IoV .^Ttfd-nsO
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proportions have been almost exactly reversed. The change has
"been rather gradual but has been accentuated during the present
War. In spite of the opinions of some to the contrary the tran-
sition must be regarded as highly commendable as a step toward
establishing a more equitable system.
(b) Borrowing
The prompt and efficient service of the Government in
adjusting the credit difficulties during the first months of
the War is indeed praise-worthy. The problem was handled with
a minimum of friction and of ultimate loss. The action of the
Government was really daring.
The resourcefulness of the leaders of the nation was
put to the test in balancing the stock exchange and in floating
the enormous loans. Mueh is to be said to their credit in this
regard. The War Borrowings of the British Government up to
March 31st, 1917 were as follows:
War Borrowings of British Government £ OOP 1 s omitted. *
Description Aug. 1,1914- April 1, April 1, Aug. 1,
Mar. 31, 1915 1915- 1916- 1914-
Mar. 31, Mar. 31, Mar. 31.
1916 1917 1917 #
4$ & 5$ War Loans of 780,377 780,377
1917
War Savings 5 yr.Oertif. 72,750 1,250 74,000
Treasury Bills 102,271** 488,818/ 61,650/ 448,197
War Expend. 2 yr.Certif. 25,561 23,561
Ways & Means Advances 197,630 19,896 217,526
ZjM> War Loan 1925-28^ 35,798 296,000 331,798
3% Exch. Bonds Mar. 1920 25,869** 47,700 21,831
4|> War Loan 1925-45;? 592,345 592,345
Statist, April 7, 1917, Vol. 89, p. 589.
#Pigures are of amounts still outstanding, Mar. 31, 1917.
Hetired during the year.
/Addition for the year.
^Through conversions £62,774,000 in issue on March 31,1916.
fin issue March 31, 1916, owin^ to conversions.
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5y U.S. A. Loan, Oct 15 50,820 50,820
5^do. Col. LoanS ei)t 16 50,000 50,000
"
n Oct.' 16 60,000 60,000
5*#" " " Jan.' 17 50,000 50,000
6$ Exchequer Bonds:
Due Oct., 1919 34,263 34,263
Due Dec. ,1920 84,140 153,689 257,829
Due Oct. ,1921 62,496 62,496
6^Exchequer Bonds
Due Feb., 1920 160,952 160,952
6f!Exch. Bonds Jap.
Issue, due Feb. 1920 10.000 10.000
Total £1,617,188 1,325,748 405,350 3,358,286
After a time the Allies learned a great lesson- that
it is cheaper for a single Power to borrow and to buy than for
all to go into the market at the same time and bid against one
another. The United States was of course the -nrincipal source of
supply for war materials. Food, munitions, and equipment were
furnished in enormous quantities. A central purchasing organiza-
tion effected a considerable saving in spite of the high prices
in America. This task of buying abroad for the Allies accounts
to some extent for the necessity of raising such large sums.
Bonar Law in his budget speech of May second, 1917 gave the total
amount loaned by Great Britain to the Allies and Dominions to
March 31, 1917 as £970,000,000, distributed as follows:
Advances Advances Total
Aug. 1, 1914- Apr. 1, 1916- Aug. 1, 1914-
IIar.31. 1916 Liar. 31, 1917 Mar. 31, 1917
Loans to Dominions £ 88,000,000 54,000,000 142,000,000
Loans to Allies 288.000.000 540.000.000 828,000,000
Total £376,000,000 594,000,000 970,000,000
This money will probably be repaid at a later date and is not
considered as a loss.
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The approximate amount of British debt March 31,1917
is shown in the following table:
Approximate Amount of British Debt I.'arch 51.1917 *
Description Interest
Rate When
3> 'aid
Date of
Maturity
Amount
OOO' s £
Omitted
Long Term Debt
:
20 Consols 24 J.A.J.O. 280,465
2$fc Annuities 8f J.A.J.O. 2,709
2-p Annuities S| J.A.J.O. 21,639
Debts to Banks of
England & Ireland
2-J-
13,646
1st War Loan Nov. 1914 3f M and S 1925-28 62,774
2nd War Loan July 1915 4§ J " D 1925-28 (e)899,997
3rd War Loan Jan. 1917 5" J " D 1929-47)
Do. Income Tax Conroounded 4 A 15 1929-42) 'pQ,Q' '
Total * 2,061,608
Short Term Debt (arranged
as far as possible ac-
cording to maturity) : Prior to
Treasury Bills (a) 4f Mar. 31, 1918 463,697
U.S.A.l-yr. Collateral
Notes of Jan., 1917 (c) F and A Feb. 1, 1918 20,000
U.S.A.2-yr. Collateral
Notes of Sept., 1916 5 M " S Sept. 1, 1918 50,000
2-yr. War Expend. Certif.(b) Je .4-Dec .31' 18 23,561
U.S.A. 2-yr. Collateral
Notes of Jan., 1917 (c) 5-|- F " A Feb. 1, 1919 30,000
Exchequer Bonds 5*~ A M Oct. 5, 1919 34,263
U.S.A.3-yr. Collateral
Notes of Oct., 1916 &§ A " Oct. 31, 1919 30,000
Exchequer Bonds 6' F " A Feb. 16, 1920 (de)170, 952
Exchequer Bonds 3 M " S Mar. 24, 1920 21,660
U.S.A. Loan Oct. 1915(c) 5 A " Oct. 15, 1920 51,370
Exchequer Bonds 5 J " D Dec. 1, 1920 (e)237,829
Exchequer Bonds 5 A " Oct. 5, 1921 (e) 62,496
U.S.A. 5-yr. Collateral
Notes of Oct., 1915 5£ A " Oct. 31, 1921 30,000
War Savings Certificates Between Feb. 20,
(15s 6d for one Dound) — 1 21 &. Mar. 31' 22 74,000
"Other Debt" — Within 5 yrs. 152,290
Ways & Means Advances — 217.526
Total 1,669,644
Other Liabilities 132 .850
Grand Total £3,864,102
*Statist, April 7, 1917, Vol. 89, p. 589. (Corrected)
(a)Rates of disc. range between anprox. 4|- & 6%. (b)Between Je.3,
1916 & July 14,1916
,
price of issue 90$; thereafter 89%. (c) Con-
vertible. (d)Including £10 million issued in Japan. (e)Subject
to deduction thru conversion into 4% & 5$ War Loans of 1917.
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A variety of paper was issued to appeal to all classes
and to meet diverse conditions. War-savings certificates and
bonds of small denominations gave the wage-earners an opportunity
to invest. In this way the saving habit was fostered and a new
interest in public affairs created. The benefits will no doubt
continue after the period of the War.
fc) Revenue Versus Loans
The proper proportion to be maintained between
revenue and loans is a difficult problem and one much debated.
The practice of Great Britain since 1740 is shown by the follow-
ing table :
18th and 19th Century Wars
Rev. $ of Total £ Revenue £ Debt £
Total
War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748)
33$ 43,000,000 14,000,000 29,000,000
Seven Years' War (1756-1763)
27$ 82,500,000 22,500,000 60,000,000
7/ar of American Seeessionj 1775-1783 )
3$ 97,500,000 3,000,000 94,500,000
Revolutionary and Na-ooleonic Wara (1793-1814)
(Historians differ but best authorities appor-
tion cost on basis of 47$ revenue and 53$
charged to debt
.
)
47$ 831,000,000 390,600,000 440,400,000
Crimean War (1854-1856)
53$ 67,500,000 35,500,000 32,000,000
Boer War (1899-1902)
32$ 211,000,000 68,000,000 143,000,000

67
The proportion of revenue raised to the total cost of these
wars covers a wide range from 3$ to 53%* Since 3% however is
an isolated instance it might he better to consider the per-
centages as from £7 to 53. The record of the present V.'ar is:
*August 1, 1914 - March 31, 1915 37$
April 1, 1915 - March 31, 1916 22$
A^ril 1, 1916 - March 31, 1917 26$
August 1, 1914 - March 31, 1917 25$
The cost of the War advanced rapidly in 1915-1916 and
the proceeds from revenue dropped in proportion. Only taxation
of a "Utopian and Suicidal character", as Mr. Asquith said,
could possibly have filled the huge gap created. Compared with
other nations, 25$ was a splendid showing for the proportion of
revenue to the total debt to March 31st, 1917. But the people
were able and ready to pay much more. The per cent was too
small.
(d) Expenditure
From votes of credit the following are met:
(1) all expenses in connection with the Army, Navy and
munitions, including the sum oxpend3d thereon in
peace times,
(2) loans and advances to Dominions and Allies,
(3) sundry payments connected with the War, such
amounts due the railways under the terms of control,
purchases of food stuffs by the Government, and a
host of miscellaneous charges.
Charges not met by votes of credit are:
interest on the War debt.
(2) Ordinary disbursements of the country, consisting of
*April 1, 1914 - March 31, 1915 40$.

interest on the pre-1Var debt, payments to local
taxation accounts, etc.,
(3) other consolidated fund services,
(4) expenditure upon the ordinary civil services,
post office services, customs and excises, and
inland revenue department.
A glance at the votes of credit show how the sums
piled up:
Votes of Credit Sanctioned "by Parliament
Year Date of Treasury Amount in
ITotice £~ million Total "by years £
1914
1915
1916
1917
August 5 100
November 12 225
325,000,000
February 25 287
July 10 250
July 19 150
September 14 250
ITovember 9 400
1,337,000,000
February 17 420
Hay 18 300
July 19 450
October 10 300
November 30 400
February 9 550
1,870,000,000
550,000,000
£ 4,082,000,000
The expenditure advanced at a steadily increasing
rate. The daily C03t for the first sixty days (August 2 - Sep
tember 30, 1914) averaged about one and one-fjfth million
pounds sterling and for the period from January 1st to March
31st, 1917, had climbed to over seven million pounds sterling
*Excluding £16,427,623 repaid to the Bank of England.

1915-16
Apr. 1 - June 30, 1 15 9]
July 1 - Sept. 50,' 15 92
Oct. 1 - Dec
.
51/ 15 92
Jan. 1 - Mar. 51,' 16 91
366
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The progression is evident from the following tabulation, worked
out by quarter years, 000' s omitted:
• Daily Expenditure. *
Period Ho. of Total for Per- Per £ Total by
Days . iod Stated. £. Day. Years .£
1914-15
Aue:. 2 - Sept. 30,' 14 60 71,683 1,195
Oct. 1 - Dee. 31, '14 92 186,098 2,023
Jan. 1 - Liar. 31, '15 _90 240,578 2.673
242 2,070 498,359
258,473 2,840
416,024 4,522
425,420 « 4,624
459,241 5.046
4,260 1,559,158
1916-17
Apr. 1 - June 30,' 16 91 444,560 4,885
July 1 - Seirfc. 30,' 16 92 460,242 5,003
Oct. 1 - Dec. 31,'16 92 661,117 7,186
Jan. 1 - Mar. 31,' 17
_90 632,194 7.Q24
365 6.022 2.198.113
Total 973 4,486 4,255,630
The expenditure of G-reat Britain included a variety
of items, such as permanent charge of debt, interest on war debt,
road improvement, payments to local taxation accounts, and
miscellaneous services (these items made up the consolidated
fund services), and votes of credit and supply. Later on the
latter two were combined. The following table is drawn up to
show the distribution of taese items for the four years from
1913-1914 to 1916-1917, the year ending March thirty-first.
Since it is easier for the eye to grasp the figures when they
i
are not too greatly extended, the 000 1 s have been omitted.
Statist, July 7, 1917, p. 17. (Corrected).
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Ex-nenr1 iture of Great Britain.
Consolidated Fund Services
Permanent Charge of debt
Interest, etc. on war debt
Road Improvement Fund
Payments to Local
Taxation Accounts , etc
.
Other Consolidated
Fund Services
Total Consolidated
Fund Services
Supply Services
Votes of Credit
1917
19,783
107,467
9,896
1.974
139,120
88,132**
1.970. 861**
1916
20,538
39,911
694
9,757
2.788
75,488
86,018
1.599.652
1915
20,497
2,172
1,528
9,529
1.694
1914
24,500
1,595
9,754
1.694
35,420 37,323
168,054jzf 160,170jrf
557.000
Grand Total 2,198,115 1,559,158 560,474 197,495
**Approximate
^Includes outlays upon the Army and Navy no?; given in expendi-
ture from Votes of Credit.
These vast sums were paid out of revenue and loans.
The revenue was collected as follows:
Revenue of Great Britain OOP's omitted (year ending I,Iar.51)#
Customs
Txc i s e
"state, etc. Duties
Stamps
land Tax
House Duty
Property and Income Tax
(including Super-tax)
Excess Profits Duty
(including Munitions Levy)
Land Value Duties
1917
70,561
56,580
31,232
7,878
640
1,940
1916
59,606
61,210
51,035
6,764
660
1,990
1915
£-
58,662
42,513
28,382
7,577
630
1,950
1914
£
35,450
59,590
27,559
9,966
700
2,000
205,035 128,320 69,399 47,249
159,920
521
140
563 412 715
Receipts from Taxes 514,106 290,088 189,305 163,029
lostal Service 24,350 24,100 20,400 21,190
Telegraph Service 3 35o 3 35o 3 00Q 3 08QTelephone Service 6 400 6 45o 6 25Q 6 53QCrown Lands 65o 55Q » 545 * 5SQ
Receipts from Sundry Loans 8,056 2,432 1,277 1,580
Miscellaneous
, 16.517 9.797 5.917 2. 504
Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue_ 59, 5? 2 46,679 57,589 55,214
Total 575,428 556,767 226,694 198,245
Statist, April 7,1917, Vol. 89, p. 589; # Do. p. 588.
t-
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The condensed, financial statement shows the revenue
and expenditure compactly. For the four years 1913-1914 to
1916-1917 the amounts are:*
Great Britain 7 s Condensed Financial Statement ( 000' s omitted
1914 1915 1916 1917
£ ± £ £
Revenue 198,243 226,694 336,767 573,428
Expenditure Char-
geable Against
Revenue 197,493 560,474 1,559,158 2,198,113
Repayments to
Bank of England 160.428
Balance Cr. 750 Dr. 323,780 Dr. 1,383,019 Dr. 1,624,685
Loans (net) 3.500 4Q7.85Q 1.325.748 1.627.188
Balance Cr. 4,250 Cr. 73,070 Dr. 57,271 Cr. 2,503
Miscel. Charges (net) 145 £3_ 6H5. 1,642
Balance Cr. 4,105 Cr. 73,017 Dr. 57,876 Cr. 861
Cash Bal.Bro' t. FrwuS.329 10.434 83.451 25.575
Cash Balance
Carried F' rw' d. 10,434 83,451 25,575 26,436
Confining the figures to the period of the War and
giving just the hare facts, the statement is as follows :#
August 1.1914 - Llarch 31.1915
Total Spent 498,359,980 Raised by Rev. 171,758,744
Increase in Exchequer
Balance 78.390.564 Net Borrowings 404.991 .800
Total 576,750,544 576,750,544
April 1.1915 - March 31.1916
Total Spent 1,559,158,377 Raised by Rev. 336,766,824
Decrease in Ex-
chequer Balance 57.875.946 Net Borrowings 1.164.515.607
Total 1,501,282,431 1,501,282,431
*8tatist, April 7, 1917, Vol. 89, p. 589.
#The Economist ( London ) .October 6, 1917, p. 486.
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April 1,1916 - Larch 51 .191 7
Total Spent
Increase in Ex-
che oner Balance
2,198,112,710 Raised by Rev. 573,427,582
860.855 Net Borrowings 1.625.545.981
Total
August 1.1914 - March 51.1917
Total Spent
Increase in Ex-
chequer Balance
4,255,631,067 Raised by Rev. 1,081,953,150
Total
21.575.471 Net Borrowings 3.195.055.588
4,277,006,558 4,277,006,558
The total expenditure to March 31, 1917 equaled
£4 ,255 ,651 ,067 - a sum so great as almost to stagger the imagi-
nation, yet how small a part of the grand total this figure may
he, no one knows. The aggregate direct cost of the twenty great-
est wars of the century and a quarter preceding the outbreak of
the present struggle was not in excess of £4,400,000,000.*
said: "The expenses of a war are a check which it has pleased
the Almighty to impose upon the ambition and lust of conquest
of meeting from year to year the expenditure which war entails
Is a salutary and a wholesome check". The statement has an odd
ring now.
(e) British Solvency
people did not practice rigid economy and save all they could,
High wages caused a feeling of prosperity with consequent
spending. By the close of the fiscal year 1916-1917, efforts
on the part of the Government to encourage maximum production and
*The Independent, February 19, 1917, p. 299.
Gladstone in 1855, while Chancellor of the Exchequer,
that are inherent in so many nations The necessity
In spite of the appeal of the Government, the British
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a reduction of consumption to the lowest practical level "began
to "bear fruit. nhere was still, however, a great deal of waste
and lack of co-operation.
It is estimated that the British could stand a year-
ly tax of one billion pounds sterling.* Loans could be floated
to a vast amount. If other means failed the final recourse
would be to a capital tax - the general liquidation of private
property for state ends. No one believes that such an extreme
measure will have to be resorted to even though circumstances
become very much worse than they now are. The Government has
declared that at all events British credit , which Mr. Asquith
says is their most valuable asset, must be maintained.# On the
taxation basis of 1916-1917, taking account of the decrease in
revenue on the return of peace from such sources as excess
profits, the permanent revenue would provide for ordinary ex-
penditures, debt charges, and pensions, with a surplus for the
reduction of the debt of about eighty-five million pounds ster-
ling a year . Mr. MeEenna pointed out that the Government never
borrows "one pound without making provision in advance by new
taxation sufficient to cover the interest and a liberal sinking
fund"
.
t
The entrance of the United States into the V/ar in
April, 1917, relieved Great Britain. Loans were then made di-
rect to the Allies by America. Furthermore, the Dominions made
arrangements to finance much of their portion of the burden
from their own resources. This improvement in the financial
^Review of Reviews, December, 1915, "Speeding the Silver
Bullets", L. R. Frewen.
Economist, Vol. 8?, pp.. 290-291.
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situation was partly offset by the growing cost of the War,
In the struggle with France specie payments were
early suspended and not again fully resumed until 1820. Throiigh-
out the present War Great Britain has never failed to pay in
gold - a record not equaled "by any of the other belligerent gov-
ernments in the War up to March 31, 1917. * The foundation of
the national credit seems "unassailably secure".
*Statist, September 16, 1916, p. 505
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